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INTRODUCTION
The late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were
periods of great change in both France and Italy.

The French

kingdom emerged from the Hundred Years ' War as a fragmented pol i ty;
the kings of France were confronted with disloyalty and frequent
insurrections on the part of the French nobility.

The reigns

of Louis XI ( 1461-1483) and Charles VIII( 1483-1498), however, saw
the decline of the great nobles of France and the consolidation
of France into a unified nation-state under the authority of
the king.

Italy, too, underwent important changes in this period .

The second half of the fifteenth century was a period of re1ativetranqui11ity in Italy.

Though the peninsula was not without

struggle among the kingdom of Naples, the duchy of Milan, the
republics of Florence and Venice, and the papal states, its
five major principalities, these powers were in a rough state
of balance .

Italians of the quattrocento.stressed the differences

between their own institutions and those of ultramontane Europe .
Convinced of their cultural and political superiority, they
operated in a political sphere which they regarded as largely
independent of the rest of Europe.

The French invasion of

Italy in 1494, made possible in part by the consolidation of
the French monarchy, was the beginning of a generation of decline for the Italian powers .

At this time, a major aspect of

the struggle between Valois France and the Habsburg Empire
was fought on Italian soil .

The end of this conflict left
1

2
most of Italy in the hands of foreign rulers by the early
sixteenth century.
An investigation of French and Florentine historiography
reveals their development in light of these political changes.
The tradition of French vernacular historiography, which began
around 1200, reflected for almost three centuries the French
feudal mentality, celebrating chivalry and the knightly heroics
of noble protagonists.

This tradition persisted almost until

the end of the fourteenth century .
Commynes, an

The work of Philippe de

adviser to Louis XI and Charles VIII, breaks

free from the moribund conceptions of previous French historiography.

Commynes was a witness to the decline of the

French nobility and the rise of the unified state, and his
account of the reign of Louis XI and of Charles VIII's
expedition to Italy accurately reflects French politics in his
day.

He discusses the strengths and weaknesses of French

rulers and seeks to analyze causally the events he records
in a manner in which his predecessors, constrained by their
idealistic attachment to the chivalric ideal, could never have
done .
Florentine historiography, from the early fourteenth
century to the end of the foreign invasions of Italy, also
reflected changes in political affairs.

The rise of the

Florentine polity in the fourteenth century was accompanied by
a self-conscious local historiography.

In the fifteenth

century, Florentine thought was dominated by humanistic
classical learning, manifested in Florentine historiography
the celebration of Fl orence as the heir of Republican Rome

by
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and by the imitation of classical historical forms .

The

invasions of Italy sparked an interest in immediate political
concerns among Florentine thinkers, and in the work of NiccOl~
Machiavelli politics and history are almost inseparable.
Francesco Guicciardini, an active pOlitical figure during this
period, attempted after Italy's foreign domination was confirmed to account for these events.

In his History of Italy

he abandons the political urgency of the work of his predecessors and the humanists ' celebration of their native city
or a particular polity.

-The Italian powers, after all, had

failed to stem the tide of successive foreign invasions .
Guicciardini seeks a framework for the analysis of the loss of
Italian liberty, but can find none .

His history is instead

an investigation of motivations and causes, a work which
finds no positive explanation for thirty years of war, princely
foll~

and the sUbjection of Italy to the yoke of foreign rule .
This paper will assess each author by investigating

the historiographical tradition out of which he emerged.

With

this in mind, we will then consider Guicciardini and Commyne s
in the light of their continuities with and departures from
the Florentine and French traditions .

Finally, the two

historians will be compared in terms of their perceptions
of causation and their schemes of explanation in their accounts
of the first French invasion of Italy in 1494 .

CHAPTER I
THE CHANGING FACES OF FRANCE AND ITALY
The Consolidation of the French Monarchy
And the Origins of the 1494 Invasion
During the reign of Louis XI(1461-1483)the de.facto
authority of the king of France was extended to encompass most
of modern Franceo

The reign of his father, Charles VII(1422-1461 ),

had seen the end of the Hundred Years' War and the beginnings
of royal consolidation, but it was Louis' reign which saw the
monarchy's most notable gains.

The king was threatened by the

League of the Public Weal, a group of powerful nobles allied
against him in defense of the feudal status guo.

Their failure

to defeat him at the Battle of Mont1h~ry, in 1465, was a great
boost for the king in h is efforts to consolidate control of
his realm.

The death in the 1477 Battle of Nancy of Duke

Charles the Bold of Burgundy, the king's most powerful and
vexing vassal, allowed Louis to accomplish the "gathering in"l
of his kingdom.

Charles' daughter and heiress, Mary of Burgundy,

had neither the men nor the money to oppose the king ' s determination to annex to the royal domain all 'of the late duke' s
French possessions.

Upon her death in 1482 it was left to

her husband, Austrian Archduke(and later Holy Roman Emperor )
Naximi1an Habsburg, to sign the Peace of Arras with Louis.
By the terms of this treaty, Louis acquired Burgundy proper ,
4

5

Flemish and Walloon Flanders, Picardy, several Somme towns
and the Boulonnais region.
remained in Habsburg hands .

Portions of the Low Countries, however ,
By virtue of the death of Duke

Rene of Anjou in 1480 and his son, the Count of Maine, in 1481,
the domains of the crown had been fUrther enriched by the
duchies of Anjou and Bar and the counties of Maine, Provence ,
Marseilles and Toulon.

By the time of his death in 1483,

Louis was well on his way to absorbing these into the administrative jurisdiction of the French crawn~

The annexation of

the duchy of Brittany was the one prize which had eluded the
"spider-king;" it would be accomplished by his son Charles VIII .
Nonetheless, Louis XI had made unprecedented gains in making
himself master of all of France.

3

The death of Louis was expected by many to signal the
end of the consolidation of the French monarchy and the French
royal domain .

At his accession, Charles VIII was but thirteen

years of age and was thought by most people, including his
father, to be unfit to rule.

In their perception of the young

king' s weakness, "the commons dreamed of taxes ' beaten dawn; '
the clergy hoped to manage their own affairs as in the palmy
days of the Gallican church; the nobles , happiest of all, envisioned a return to the good old feuda l universe.,,4

Foreseeing

these challenges to his son's authority, Louis had named his
daughter Anne and her husband , Peter of Beaujeu, as regents
for Charles VIII.

They proved very capable indeed of overcoming

the threats to the monarchy which arose when in 1484, the
Estates-General of the realm met and deliberated on nothing
.
less than " the maklng
of a new worl d

. ff

5

However, their efforts

6

to effect change in the administration of the kingdom were
frustrated by the various members' special interests and when
the Estates

separate~Anne

of Beaujeu resumed without difficulty

the government of France, keeping it until 1491.

6
/

Throughout this period, though, Duke Louis of Orleans was
a rival to her authority.

He undertook a series of ventures

against the French regents, forming alliances with Henry VII
of England, King Ferdinand of Aragon, and Emperor Maximi1 iano
He sought refuge in Brittany, where Duke Francis waS in revolt
against the French kingdomo

In 1488, the armies of Anne of

Beaujeu routed the Breton army and took Louis of Orleans
p risoner .
'"
Anne increased her power and reputation when in the same year
her brother-in-law, Duke John of Bourbon, died, leaving his
duchy to Anne's husband and co-regent.
to release Louis from his imprisonment 0

Anne steadfastly refused
In 1491, however, after

the death of Duke Francis of Brittany had attenuated the threat
of a Breton invasion, Charles VIII, now in control of the
.

. . . .

klngdom, released hlS COUSln LOU1S from prlson.

7

Peter of

Bourbon and Louis of Or1~ans then took joint vows Uto hold one
another once more in perpetual affection ••• and to loyally
serve King Charles . u8
The greatest act that remained to be accomplished in the
consolidation of the French nation was the union of Brittany
to France. The young Duchess Anne of Brittany, who had entertained the proposals of French, English and German suitors,
agreed after extensive negotiations to marry the French king .
The terms of this "brilliant and difficult" marriage, concluded
in December of 1491, included a clause which gave Charles '

7

successors her rights to the duchy of Brittany.9
Charles' next major concern transcended the boundaries of
the French royal domain.

The Italian kingdom of Naples, once

the possession of the French house of Anjou, had for half a
century been in the hands of a cadet branch of the royal
of Aragon.

house

Charles' thoughts were now directed to the reassertion

of the French claim to the Neapolitan throneo
The French claim to the kingdom of Naples dated back to
1261~

Charles of Anjou was invited in that year by Pope Urban

IV to occupy the throne of the Kingdom of the Two Sici1ies, a
papal fief, when its last Hohenstaufen occupant died and his
line was extinguished.

The royal house of Aragon also had

a claim to the throne, established in 1209 when the sister
of the Aragonese king had married the Hohenstaufen Emperor
Frederick II.

The 1282 War of the Sicilian Vespers, a revolt

against Angevin rule, resulted in the division of the Kingdom
of the Two Sici1ies.

Peter III of Aragon assumed control of

Sicily, while Angevin rule over the kingdom of Naples continued.
Control of the kingdom by the house of Anjou was essentially
unchallenged until the late fourteenth century, when a rival
branch of the Angevin line and the royal family of Aragon began
to assert their claims to the Neapolitan throne.

The Angevin

queen of Naples, Joanna II, appealed to the French for aid in
1414, but the French, preoccupied with the Hundred Years' War,
were unable to assist her.
war

Alfonso

In 1442, after a protracted civil

V, of a cadet line of the Aragonese royal family,

was invested with the Neapolitan crown by Pope Eugenius IV.10
King Alfonso of Naples rapidly consolidated

his control of

8

his new kingdom, and was soon accepted by Italian rulers as
a part of the Italian political scene.

He was a signatory twelve

years later to the Peace of Lodi, ratified by all five major
Italian pawers o

This treaty ended a period of extended warfare

in northern Italy, which primarily

had ~' Emtailed

Venetian and

Florentine border disputes with the Visconti(and, after 1450,
Sforza)dukes of Milan, but in which Naples and the papacy had
beteitl involved as well.

While there were disputes among the

Italian powers in the aftermath of Lodi, the 1454 pact had
left them in a state of approximate balance which they all took
great pains to preserve .

The Triple Alliance of 1480 among

Florence, Milan and Naples and the cool diplomacy of Lorenzo
de' Medici contributed to the preservation of Italian peaceo
The death of Lorenzo in 1492 and the specter of invasion by
Charles VIII of France , however, contributed to the breakdown
of the Italian state-system and the seemingly endless devastating
. h ensue d 0 11
wars WhlC

In 1493 a conflict arose between Ludovico Sforza, the
regent of Milan' s Duke GiangaleazZOand the nephew of Ludovico,
and King Ferrante of Naples.

Giangaleazzo ' s wife, Isabella

of Aragon, was the daughter of AlfohsO of Calabria, son of the
Neapolitan king.

Isabella complained to her father that

Ludovico was depriving her husband of his right to govern the
duchy.

Alfonso saw an opportunity to assert the tenuous

Aragonese claim to the duchy of Milan, obtained in the highly
disputed testament of the duchy by its last Visconti duke to
the Aragonese house of Naples.

In April of 1493, after attempts

to reconcile Alfonso and Ludovico failed, Ludovico threatened

9

to invite Charles VIII to make good his claim to the throne of
Nap1es.

12

Ludovico had at one time claimed to be able to move

the rulers of Europe "like pieces on a chessboard,,,13 and thought
that Charles would not accept his invitation.
Ludovico

and the rest of Italy's rulers were accustomed

to the Italians ' traditional conception of their political
affairs operating independently of the powers beyond the Alps.
The consolidation of France, the Holy Roman Empire and Spain
under single rulers, however, made possible the invasions of
Italy by these powers.

Previously, it had been cadet branches

of Europe's royal houses which had vied for control of parts
of Italy; the late fifteenth century saw these concerns taken
up by kings.

The AEagonese had long been interested in Italian

affairs through their involvement in Naples.

An Imperial claim

to the duchy of Milan had been established through a marriage
between the Habsburg and Sforza families.

The marriage of the

last Visconti heiress to the Milanese duchy to the Duke of

Or1~ans in the 1440's had given the French a second dynastic
claim in Italy.

This latter claim would be asserted, to no

aVail, by Louis of Or1~ans during Charles VIII' s Italian
expedition, but the duke was to make good this claim when
he was crowned King Louis XII upon the death of Charles in
1498.

Beyond his invitation by Ludovico Sforza to invade Italy,

Charles VIII himself de sired this expedition.

Much of the

Flemish and Burgundian territory annexed by his father had
been retaken by the Empire in the 1480's, leading to a feeling
of encirclement by the growing territories of the Habsburgs .
Moreover, the duchy of Anjou had become a royal territory during

10

the reign of Louis XI .

Thus it was no longer a cadet branch

of the French royal family which held France's claim to the
Neapolitan throne. The invitation by Ludovico to invade Naples
was the occasion for the urging of Charles by his "shallow
favorites" to "assert the glory of his arms.,,14

The king's

older advisers(including Philippe de Commynes), who had served
his more prudent f 'a ther, argued that this expedition would not
·
serve F rench lnterests
.15

He did not heed their advice, however,

and decided to accept the invitation extended to him by
Ludovico Sforza .
The Subjection of Italy to Foreign Domination
Charles VIII crossed the Alps in the fall of 1494 .

Milan

had been the power which had invited him to come to Italy; thus
he encountered no opposition while crossing Milanese territory.
When he reached Tuscany, however, Florentine fortresses opposed his
army's progress .

Piero de' Medici, who had inherited control

of Florence upon his father's death in 1492, had initially
sided with Naples in the ensuing conflict, but was forced to
reconsider this position when Charles' army threatened Florentine
dominions .

Following the example of his father, who had

journeyed to Naples to negotiate with King Ferrante when the
two powers Bad been at war in 1478, Piero left Florence to
meet the French king.

Piero, though, was not blessed with his

father's diplomatic skill,

and surrendered most of Florence's

North Tuscan possessions to Charles.

Piero also enjoyed little

of the support within Florence that his father had possessed, as
his failure to support the traditional Florentine alliance

wi th France

11
had led to the expulsion from France and financial ruin of
many Florentine merchants.

Outraged by P iero's surrender of

Florentine territory, a large coalition of Florence's citizens
ousted Piero from power .
formed.

A new, broadly based republic was

King Charles entered Florence in November, 1494 as

the man whom the Dominican friar Girolamo Savonoro1a had p redicted would be sent by God to regenerate Italian politics and
the Church .

Florentine leaders signed a treaty recognizing

Charles as the protector of Florentine liberties, and Florence
remained essentially a vassal of the French crown until 1512,
when the French were driven out of Italy.

Charles' formidable

army passed through the papal states without opposition, and in
February of 1495 entered the kingdom of Naples.

Alfonso, now

king, resigned the crown hoping that his more popular son
Ferrantino would be able to rally support.

The young king,

however, was unable to stay the French advance .

Charles VIII

had won the kingdom of Naples without fighting a single battle,
but it would prove more difficult to hold than to win.

16

King Ferdinand of Aragon was determined to overthrow
French rule in Naples and make good on the long-standing
Aragoneseclaim to the Kingdom of the Two Sici1ies .

He was

instrumental in the organization of the League of Venice in
March, 1495.

The league was joined by the rope Alexander VI,

Emperor Maximilian, Ludovico Sforza, and the Venetian republic .
Its purpose was to provide for the mutual defense of their
states against aggression.

Formally, it resembled previous

treaties among Italian powers, but the inclusion of Spain and
the Empire pointed to the fact that Italians no longer controlled

12
the destiny of Italy. 17
Charles' rule, which involved the installation of his
favorites in the Neapolitan bureaucracy, proved extremely unpopular and difficult to maintain.

As he was leaving Italy in

July of 1495, his armie s met those of the League at the Battle
of Fornovo, in which both sides suffered heavily .

It was not

so much a French victory as it was a loss for the League,
which in failing to rout the French army had allowed it to return safely to France.

Meanwhile, the French occupants of

Naples slowly lost control of the kingdom, and by 1496 Ferrantino
had regained control of his capital.

Charles VIII planned

another expedition, but his death in 1498 ended his dream of
further conquest.

18

Charles' successor to the French throne was Louis of
Orleans, who became King Louis XII.

He, like Charles, coveted

the Neapolitan crown but, as mentioned earlier, his aspirations
included the duchy of Milan as well.

Thus he

assume~

in addition

to his title of King of France, the titles of King of Naples and

19
.
.
F rench lnvaSlon
.
.
h e h ad unsuccess.
Duke of Mllan.
Durlng
the flrst
fully attempted to make good his Milanese claim by pressing
King Charles to make war upon Milan while the French army was
retreat-ing - from Naples, and it continued to be his foremost
thought.

In addition to his own political interest Louis was

urged to invade Italy by his chief

advise~

the Archbishop of

Rouen George of Amboise, who aspired not only to a cardinalate
.
20
but to the papacy ltself .

The reaction of the Italian powers to Louis ' plans set
the tone Of Italian pol i tics for the duration of the period

13
of the ultramontane invasions, and indicates the demoralizing
effect which Charles' invasion had had upon the Italian powers .
Their chief thought was not opposition to Louis , but the use
of his intervention to serve their individual interests.

Pope

Alexander VI hoped that the invasion of Milan would direct the
attention of that state away from its southern border and would
allow his son Cesare Borgia to gain control of the Romagna at
the expense of Milan.

Venice, which since Lodi had hoped only

to keep its western border intact and focus its attention on
its maritime enterprises, now hoped to expand westward.

The

Venetian government chose to support Louis when he offered
Venice several Milanese towns in exchange for its support .
Florence, which in 1495 had refused to join the League of
Venice and instead aided the French , againi

supported the French

cause , hoping for now for French aid in recovering Pisa, liberated
from Florentine domination by Charles VIII in 1494.

All but

the recently crowned King Federigo of Naples, whose throne
Louis XII

claime~and

some of the petty despots of the Romagna,

who feared Cesare Borgia, supported the French against Milan .
Ludovico Sforza's incompetent generals lost garrison after
garrison, and finally Milan itself.

Sforza fled to the Austrian

Tyrol with his two sons Massimiliano and Francesco, under the
protection of Emperor Maximilian.

A brief attempt by Ludovico

to regain power failed and the Battle of Novara in 1500 ended
the independent Sforza

dynas~in

Milan.

Ludovico spent the

remainder of his life in a French prison.
Louis XII had already made plans for the kingdom of
Naples .

After prolonged negotiation with Ferdinand of Aragon,

14
it was agreed by the two kings in the treaty of Granada of
November, 1500, that they would partition the Neapolitan kingdom,
1fith the French controlling the northern half, including Naples
itself, and Spain controlling the southern half and the island
of Sicily • . The unfortunate King Federigo of Naples, betrayed
by his kinsman Ferdinand, agreed to support Louis in his future
undertakings, and was given the duchy of Anjou in return.
Disputes among the French and Spanish allies led to the expulsion
of the French from Naples in 1504.
u~der

The kingdom had been reunited

Spanish domination.
Louis XII ' s Italian expedition had greatly benefited the

papacy.

Cesare Borgia had made himself master of the Romagna.

His plans for domination of Tuscany were thwarted by the Florentine
alliance with France, and he considered abandoning his French
alliance for Spain.

His military career ended abruptly, though,

upon his father's death in 1503.

Alexander was succeeded

Pope pius III, who reigned briefly and died.

by

His successor,

Julius II, planned to recover all of the states of the Church
and then lead an Italian confederation to drive all foreigners
from Italy and reassert Italian political independence.

His

greatest prize was the city of Bologna, which had eluded
Cesare Borgia but which was taken by Julius II in 1506 .

The

pattern of alliance on the Italian peninsula, however, was
drastically altered when the Empire became involved anew in
Italian affairs.
Emperor Maximilian Habsburg had been growing increasingly
anxious about Louis XII's desire to secure the papacy for
George of Amboise, and wanted to shore up his position in

15
Italian affairs .

In 1507 he announced his intention to t ravel

to Rome to receive the imperial investiture from Julius II,
although his claim to the duchy of Milan could not have been
absent from his thinking.

The Venetian government, seeking

to limit the role of foreign powers in Italy, had announced i ts
decision to deny Maximilian passage through Venice's terra
firma, but he went ahead with his plan to travel to Rome, by
force of arms if necessary.

In 1508 his forces were defeated

by armies in the employ of Venice, and the Venetian government
gained control of several hitherto Habsburg cities.

Julius II,

irked by recent Venetian inroads against papal territories, now
perceived the greatest threat to Italian security to be Venetian
expansion .

In 1508 he organized the League of Cambrai, which

included himself, Louis XII, the Empire, Mantua and Ferrara .
That Julius included the French in this league is problematic,
since his long-term goal was the expulsion of Louis XII from
Italy.

Julius felt,

though~

that it was necessary to end Venice ' s

lust for conquest before such a concerted Italian effort
could be made.

The forces of the League overwhelmed the

Venetian army, and in 1509, at the Battle of Agnadello,
Venice lost virtually all of her terra firma possessions .
Gradually, as Venice's former subject cities realized that
Venetian overlordship had been preferable to what had followed,
they returned to the fold .

Julius II, having recovered his

possessions in the Romagna, abandoned the League of Cambrai and
formed the Holy League against France .

The decisive battle

of this campaign was the battle of Ravenna, fought in 1512 ,
between the forces of the Holy League and the French army .

16

It was a victory for the French, for they retained control
of Milan, but their victory was made very costly by the death
of their brilliant commander Gaston of Foix.
With this battle, the Swiss cantons assume an important
role in Italian affairs.

Swiss soldiers had hitherto been em-

ployed by the French as mercenaries, but a series of trade disputes had cooled their friendship with Louis XII, and they
began to feel that unilateral action would best serve their
interests.

In 1513 the French garrison at Milan was routed by

the Swiss in the Battle of Novara.

The Swiss had brought with them

Ludovico Sforza's elder son Massimiliano, whom the Holy League
recognized as Duke of Milan.
control of the duchy.

The Swiss, though', retained real

The recent decline of the French in

Italyz,also meant the end of the francophile Florentine republic
and the restoration of the Medici to political prominence.

Actually,

the French alliance had been of little benefit to the republic,
which in 1509 had retaken Pisaexclusively by the force of
it own arws.

In addition, the refusal of Paolo SOderini, the

leader of the republic, to join the Holy League of Julius II
against France had incurred the pope's wrath against the city.
The resulting discontent within Florence played into the hands
of the Medici party.

The election in 1513 of Cardinal Giovanni

de' Medici to succa9d Julius as Pope
control of Florence.

Leo~J{

consolidated Medici

With the M@dici family restored to power

and the French gone from Italy, the explosiveness of the Italian
political scene subsided somewhat.

Thus, the next French

invasion found Italy unprepared to deal with the resumption of
war.

17
The third French invasion was undertaken by King Francis I,
of the house of Valois, who succeeded Louis XII upon his death
in 1515 .

The new king immediately prepared to invade Italy, and

crossed the Alps in August of that year .

The following month,

the French army routed the Swiss at the battle of Marignano and
Francis I became Duke of Milan.
al Florentine

Pope Leo X renewed the tradition-

alliance with France, yielding to the king

Parma and Piacenza, cities traditionally disputed by Milan
and the papacy, in exchange for a guarantee by Francis to support
the Medici in Florence.

A.fter Marignano, Spain stood as the

only effective rival to the power of the French in Italy, and
all that was left within the power of the Italian political
leaders during the ensuing Habsburg-Va1ois struggle was to
attempt "to preserve some measure of freedom by playing off one
.
agal.nst
the ot h er." 21

Emperor Maximilian died in 1519; the next phase of the
struggle between these two rival houses was for the imperial
investiture.

Ultimately, it was the superior financial resources

of Maximilian ' s grandson Charles of Austria that won him the
election, contested bitterly by King Francis of France. 22
Pope Leo X had been supporting the French in Italy, but
desiring cooperation wi.th the German princes in the suppression
of the Lutheran heresy, he concluded a pact with Char1es·\; V, the
new Holy Roman Emperor.

Later that year their combined forces

ousted the French from Milan, and restored once again· the
house of Sforza, in the person of Ludovico ' s younger son
Francesco, to the duchy.

In 1522 the papal-imperial army

besieged and pillaged Genoa, the last French stronghold in Italy,

18

and crippled the French fleet .

Leo X had died in 1521, and

after the brief pontificate of Adrian VI of Utrecht, the
election in 1523 of Cardinal Giulio de' Medici as Pope Clement
VII was a great victory for the Emperor, who seemed to have
the papacy under his control.
The pattern of shifting alliances continued.

Late in

1524 Clement, Venice and Florence, uneasy with Charles V' s
successes, concluded a secret alliance with King Francis of
France.

The French army attacked Milan, and the duchy once

again changed hands.

French control was to prove short-lived,

however, as in February, 1525 the French army, in the Battle of
Pavia, suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Spanish
and German armies of the Empire.
repercussions.

This battle had immense

France, since Marignano Europe's pre-eminent

military power,was reduced to second-rate status behind Charles V,
Europe's new master .

Francis I, taken prisoner at Pavia, won

his release only by renouncing all of his claims to power in
Italy .
The continuing concern of Italian leaders with balance of
power and fluid alliances meant, however, that France's defeat
attracted allies to her side.

In 1526, Clement VII, Francesco

Sforza(who had been expelled by the Emperor from Milan in favor
of a Habsburg claimant to the t auchy.), and the governments of
Florence and Venice formed the Holy League of Cognac to combat
Charles.

The army of the league, with Francesco Guicciardini

as Commissioner-General, was disorganized and ineffectual.
May, 1527 Charles ' armies sacked Rome.

In

The imprisonment of

Clement VIr meant the end of the current Medici regime in Fl orence
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and the restoration of a republic.

The French, however, with

Andrea Doria in command of the Genoese fleet, threatened the
Habsburgs' control of the kingdom of Naples .

When in 1528 Doria ,

sensing imminent French defeat, defected to the Spanish side,
the French army pressing Naples had no alternative but to retire .
Thirty-five years of warfare in Italy had come to an end .
By the terms of the 1529 Treaties of Barcelona and Cambrai, a
grand settlement was achieved.

The Medici were established as

Grand Dukes of Tuscany, and the duchy of Milan was returned to
Francesco Sforza.

Both principalities remained under the

domination of the Habsburgs .

The two sons of the French King

Francis, who had four years earlier become Charles V' s pr i soners
in exchange for their father ' s liberty, were freed .

King

Francis was to marry Eleanor of Austria, the sister of the Emperor,
, renounce d h'1S cla1ms
,
' I taly. 23
and once aga1n
1n

Perhaps the most salient observation that can be made
concerning the affairs of Italy during the period of the invasions
is that while the narration of the invasions begins with the
recounting of a conflict between Naples and Milan, it ends
with a conflict between France and the Holy Roman Empire .
Italy had indeed lost control of its destiny .

CHAPTER II
CELEBRATING THE POLITY :
Florentine Historiography, 1300-1525
One of the most important aspects of Italian humanism was
the attitude toward history characteristic of this movement.
History emerged in the Renaissance as the record of the actions
of men, of individuals and groups, acting in a political framework.

This had certainly not been the case in much of the his-

torica1 writing of the medieval period .

History was divinely

ordained, the notion that God's judgment was everywhere manifest
in history was taken for granted by most medieval chronic1er.

.

hlstorlans .

1

The roots of Renaissance historiography are to be found in
the chronicles of fourteenth-century Florence .

Medieval Italy

differed from much of ultramontane Europe in that it was not
characterized by feudalism, schOlasticism and monarchy. 2
Medieval Italy was communal, and within the communes factional
strife and disputes over l ocal

political issues were intense.

These disputes, in which sizeable numbers of lay citizens were
often inVOlved, evinced among thoughtful citizens an interest
in the history of their communities, fostering an

unprece-

dented, if not uniquely Italian, interest in local historiography.

In Italy, then, the emergence of the lay historian ' s

interest in the history of the polity preceded similar
20

21
developments in the rest of Europe .

3

In fourteenth-century Florence, this historiography can
be studied most easily in the writings of Giovanni Villani(?-1348)
and others who followed him.

Villani's historical conscious-

ness derived from his status as a member of Florence's merchant
class and from the recent political experiences of Florence
in the affairs of Italy.

The merchant class in Florence had

recently wrested political control of the city from the aristocratic noble class, and its commercial progress in the early
.
"
b le."4
treeento
seeme d"lrreslsta

Florence had also been part of

the pro-papal Guelph alliance in the thirteenth-century struggle
between the papacy and the Empire.

This association of Florence

vrith the papacy meant for Villani that Florence merited a
"centrality within the scheme of the medieval universe it
could not otherwise have had.,,5

Thus, it was the coincidence

of the newly-acquired self-confidence of Villani's merchant
class with an historical background which appeared to justify
its claim for a place within the medieval world order that
stimulated Villani's historical consciousness and prompted him
to write the history of Florence.

6

While Villani based his discussion of contemporary
Florentine political affairs on his own independent and astute
observation, his ideas still reflect the conventions of medieval
historical thought.

He still sets the history of Florence in

the context of universal history; his Chronicle begins with
the story of the tower of Babel, and he repeatedly sees the
hand of divine providence in human events.

7

For Villani,

the order inherent in history reflects a grand, cosmic design,

22
which interweaves natural and supernatural forces into a
.
8
harmon1ous whole.

Villani's cosmic design included fortune as well as God .
Fortune served an explanatory purpose, as an agent behind those
historical events that defied explanation.

The medieval

Christian historians viewed fortune as "the undependabi1ity
and transitoriness of all earthly things;,,9 it was superceded
by divine providence as the ultimate determinant of human events .
This was the view adopted by Giovanni Villani.

In subsequent

Renaissance historiography, man was given a more decisive role
in history.

Fortune was to acquire a somewhat different meaning ,

but it retained its basic role as a force to which the inscrutable
elements of the historical process were ascribed.
In Villani's scheme, all issues were framed in terms
of a choice between right and wrong, the godly and the ungodly. 10
Fortune was seen as operating in a rhythmic fashion, first
rising, then declining.

The operation of fortune in Villani ' s

Chronicle cannot be separated from the circumstances of the
papacy, "the identity of whose interests is the kingpin of
· l
'
..
.
,11
V 11
an1's
sch erne of h'1stor1ca1
1nterpretat1on.'

Villani

narrates the Guelph struggle against the Hohenstaufen emperors
in these terms.

After it seemed that nothing could avert his

ultimate triumph, the Emperor Frderick II suffered a series
of dramatic setbacks.

His rise and fall fitted the cyclical

pattern of fortune described by Villani.

Frederick's ultimate

failure was a function of his "wrong" (i. e . contrary to the interests
.
12
of the papacy and thus of G
od) act1ons.

On the death of

Conradin, the last of the Hohenstaufen lineage, in 1268, Villani

23
writes that " it is evident from reason and experience that whosoever raises himself against the force s of the Church and is
excommunicated must come to a bad end in soul and body . ,,13
One recent historian has said of medieval chronicles
that their organaization "tends to organize facts in a one-thingafter-another way; and so to exclude explanation, " adding that
"the favorite connective is not 'because' 'o r 'as a result of'
'
b ut 'meanwh lIe'
." 14

Clearly, however,

.Giwanni Villani's

sense of history transcended such a simple formula .

In his

cyclical pattern of history, success brings pride, pride sin,
15
and sl'n leads to decll'ne.

I n excep t'lIg on1 y F lorence_. and t h e

papacy from the application of this rule, Villani adopts a
scheme of history that ascribes to his awn age and the circumstances of the Florentine republic a central place in the texture
of time,16 and justifies the parochial focus of his Chronicle
For most of Villani's lifetime, this scheme was adequate for
his purposes of historical explanation.

It is now assumed

that he composed his Chronicle beginning in 1322 and continued
writing until he succumbed to the Plague in 1348 . 17

The last

decade of Villani ' s life saw events which utterly undermined
the basis for his reading of history.

The Buonacorsi family,

with which he was commercially affiliated, went bankrupt in
1338, leading to Villani ' s humiliating imprisonment for debt . 18
The tyranny of Walter of Brienne, Duke of Athens, an·

adventurer

who came to power in 1340 after a dispute over a war with Lucca
had internally weakened the Florentine government, was a period
of political eclipse for the merchant class of which Villani
was a member .

In 1343 , the expulsion from papal service of

24
the Bardi and Peruzzi, Florence's two most prominent banking
families, led to their bankruptcy and the commercial ruin of
Florence.
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More importantly for Villani, this break with the

papacy unravelled the Guelph alliance, which had been the thread
of his view of Florentine history.

The final calamitous event

in Villani'S life was the outbreak of plague in 1347.

These di-

sasters led Villani to abandon in the last books of his Chronicle
the pattern of interpretation used earlier, in which "the course
of events had easily accomodated itself to an interpretation
according to which the balance always tipped in favor of the
f orces

'
V'lllanl's
,
,
' h teousness." 20 U n d er1Ylng
of rlg
Vlew
that all

thing s u1timiate1y revert to a moral equilibrium had been the
original presumption of finite time, bound to culminate in an
all-encompassing apocalypse.

The events of the last decade of

his life, cUlminating in severe earthquakes in North Italy in
1348, were interpreted by Villani as the "sign that Jesus Christ,
preaching to his disciples, predicted should appear at the end of
the wor1d.,,21

Villani, then, while transcending the medieval

style of the strict . narration':. of factual information and
positing an overarching scheme for the arrangement of historical
evidence, still placed his experience "within the sanctified
'
,
22
seh erne of t h e me d leva1
unlverse."
Trecento chroniclers after Giovanni Villani both borrowed from his thought and made sUbstantive changes in his mode
of historical interpretation.

His brother Matteo, who wrote

from 1348 to 1363, also saw divine retribution as an explanatory
agent.

For Matteo Villani, however, there was no political

attitude that was always morally " right" as the pre-1343 Guelph

25

alliance had been for his brother .

Matteo' s chronicle was

characterized by a God who did not take fixed sides .

God instead

favored the side of virtue and punished wrongdoers rega:rdless of
..
d 23
wh 0 h a d b een lnJure.

.
.
.
H1S
concept of fortune d lffered
from hlS

brother's idea of a monolithic force that always brings down
the mighty from power .

Instead he saw fortune as a capricious

force which, since it obeyed no discernible law, could not be
understood.

Fortune was seen as the force behind impulsive

.

human b e h aVlor.

24

Louis Green makes the important point that

in viewing fortune as something that operates essentially randomly, and in attributirgindividual human actions to fortune,
Matteo Villani allows individual events to be invested with
.

.

..

t h elr own causal slgnlflcance.
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Finally, Matteo Villani turns

away from the Guelph identification of Fl orence as the basis
for Florence's exalted status, and instead points to Florence ' s
republican liberty, which he claims she had inherited from the
Roman republic.

Though this theme would later be adopted by the

humanists, Villani's conception stemmed not from the humanists '
thorough conversance with Latin authors, but from the need to
find a new political identity for Florence when the two pillars
of medieval society, the Church and the Empire, were weakened
. .

.

and at odds wlth the lnterests of the Florentlnes.
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A crucial link between the work of the trecento chronicl ers
and that of the quattrocento humanists is found in the work of
Gregorio Dati, who composed his History of Florence in 1407-8. 27
Dati, who like the Villani brothers was a member of Florence's
merchant class,essentially confined the scope of his history
to Florence ' s wars with Giangaleazzo

Visconti, Duke of Milan,

26
and thus covered only the years 1380-1406 .

Dati ' s conception

of fortune stripped it completely of its association with divine
intervention.

For Dati, divine providence could still be a

factor in history and s uspend the workings of nature .
was man's own ability to intervene in natural events .

Fortune
28

Human passions, however, were given a de'herministic quality which
detracted from Dati's a bilityto make a three-dimensional analysis .
While on one hand Dati attributes Giangaleazzo's ultimate defeat
to his overly ambitious aims, "Giangaleazzo's ambition was given
a s compulsive character which impelled hiin, irresistabfuy towards
his doom in a way that recalls strikingly the self-destructive
tendency of evil in Giovanni Villani's interpretation of history .,, 29
Dati also compared the Florentine republic with ancient Rome,
but, as had been the case with Matteo Villani, this identification
stemmed primarily from praise of Florence's communal tradition
and not from the literature of classical antiquity.
There remains a l ink between Dati and Giovanni Villani
in the attribution to God of considerable power in the unfolding
of events.

For Dati, h owever, God does not rule through i m-

mediate intervention, but as the ultimate cause of a material
reality which is ruled by its own inherent tendencies.

30

Thus

the trecento in Florence ends with historians who reflect an
historical consciousness "still inspired by the primitive wonder
out of which the apprehension of the order they assume had
initially arisen," but who had prepared the way "for the

s~para-

tion of the human world into a self-sufficient universe of its
own in which historY •• • could become a new, more selective inquiry
.
lnto
the natural causes

0

f
t s.". 31
even

27

If the historiography of the fourteenth century belonged
to the merchant-chronicler, in the fifteenth century it belonged
to the humanist .
antiquity.

Humanism was , above a ll a focus on classical

The term humanista was coined during the Renaissance

itself, and was derived from an older concept, the studia humanitatis .
This term generally referred to a liberal or literary education,
and had been used in this sense by such ancient Roman authors
as Cicero and Aulus Gellius.

Italian scholars of the late

trecento revived this meaning of the term, . and the studia
humanitatis came to refer to a clearly defined curriculum which
included moral philosophy, poetry, grammar, rhetoric and history .
In all of these fields, humanism emphasized the reading and
interpretation of ancient . Latin and in some cases Greek authors . 32
This focus on the classics was important in determining the
content of humanist histories.
Humanists recognized two kinds of h istorical writing .
The first was the chronicle, whose form had been ascendant in
the fourteenth century .

The second was the "true history," which

was based upon classical models,
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especially the histories

of Sallust and Livy, from whom the humanists derived their
.
. h polltlcal
. .
.
34
exclUSlve
concern Wlt
affalrs.

F rom classlcal
.

historians the humanists borrowed certain stylistic conventions
as well.

The inclusion of elaborate battle narratives, the use

of omens for predictive purposes(not for causal explanations) and
the inclusion of set speeches to express the opinions of historical figures and on occasion the historians themselves were
all classical inheritances.
Humanist historiography was also exclusively concerned

28
with heroic actions .

From Tacitus, humanist historians l earned

that " low people, things, or words" were beneath the dignity
.
35
.
.
of hlstory.
ThlS concern can be detected ln the preface of
Leonardo BrunUHistory of Florence, which Bruni, as chancellor
of Florence, composed between 1428 and his death in 1444 .
Bruni writes : "I intend to write down the deeds of the Florentine
people, their we·r ghty struggles at home and abroad, their
renowned deeds in peace and in war . ,,36
Bruni, in focusing on the virtues of Florence in particular,
expresses an aspect of what is now termed "civic humanism," a
notion whose analysis by Hans Baron in The Crisis of the Early
Italian Renaissance was an important contribution to the understanding of humanist historiography.

According to Baron, the

lone resistance of Florence to the expansive tyranny of Giangaleazzo
Visconti encouraged Florence to portray herself as the inheritor
and defender of the liberty of the ancient republics of Athens
and Rome.

In his Panegyric to the City of Florence, written

in l403/4~in the immediate aftermath of the war with Giangaleazzo ,
Bruni writes o.1E.::':'.the war with Milan that "Florence knew that it
was a Roman tradition to defend the liberty of Italy against its
enemies.,,38

Praise for Florence as the heir of the Roman

republic is an important element of Bruni's writing.

This

republican interpretation of history, according to Baron and
others who accept his idea of civic humanism, could not have
emerged fully until the Milanese wars accented Florence's
republican glory.
much deeper roots .

Mobilization of this opinion, however , had
It has also been pointed out that the

hortatory nature of the Panegyric COUld have borne relevance

29

as the Fl orentines fought the final stages of their war with
Milan .

39

The breakdown of the Guelph alliance, discussed earlier,

vhich culminated in the Eight Saints ' war with the papacy, from
1375 to 1378, and the absence of the empire from any significant
role ln Italy, highlighted Florence's independent political role . 40
That the humanist historiographers of the fourteenth century
celebrated ,the virtues of their polity can also be explained by the
fact that as chancellors of Florence, they were in the employ of
the Republic .

They were thus unlikely to draw negative conclusions

about the Florentine experience or its system of government .
A second interpretation of quattrocento humanism has
focused on the humanists as rhetoricians.

Paul Oscar Kristeller

sees the humanists as inheritors of medieval Italian dictatores,
officials whose duties included the composition of letters and
speeches and who also held chairs of grammar and rhetori c in
Italian universities ~l The dictatores, Kristeller, writes, "were
no classical scholars, and used no classical models for their
compositions .

It was the novel contribution of the humanists

to add the firm belief that in order to write and speak well
' t s.' ,42
l't was necessary to stu d y an d 'lml't ate t h e anClen

Kristeller ,

in fact, asserts that the study of history was, for the humanists,
subservient to their rhetorical studies : "History was not
taught as a separate subject , but formed a part of the study
of rhetoric and poetry since the ancient historians were among
' ,
, d 'ln sch 001." 43
t h e prose wrlters
commonly studle

Analysis of humanist historiography must take both the
civic and rhetorical aspects of quattrocento humanism into
account.

In this light, the humanists' propagandistic u se of

30

history becomes clear .

The humanists saw history as a means

by which their moral precepts could be illustrated and inculcated .
graphy .

Here was the rhetorical aspect of humanist historioBruni's civic history combined rhetoric and a republican

view of history, and emerged with an inspiring message for the
citizens of Florence.

We can see this association in the

following speech, found in Bruni's History of Florence:
As(the measures needed by the republic that are necessary
for our liberty)are easy ••• and lie in your hands, who is
so fallen that he would rather serve in pain and humiliation
than be equal to others in right and honor? Our ancestors
were not willing to Serve even the Roman emperors ••• When
I remember your degenerate passivity I cannot be silent
and calm. I only ask you to think of your awn liberty
and w"elfare. 44
This speech is put by Bruni in the mouth of Giano della Bella,
a leader of the Florentine popolo against the city's merchants
in a 1292 dispute.

In its inspiring call to uphold Florence ' s

age-old position as the defender of republican liberty, it
combines the civic and rhetorical aspects of humanist historiography in a message which was as applicable to Bruni's fellow
citizens in their ongoing struggle with Milan as it was t o the
popolo of the late duecento.
The humanists, unlike the chroniclers of the trecento
whose l ivelihood had been Florence's
generally professional scholars.

commerc~al

affairs, were

Often, their search for

employment was an important part of their writings .

Bruni

himself was not a Florentine; his home was Arezzo, and i t has
been asserted that his Panegyric to the City of Florence,
written in the very early years of the fifteenth century, was
an attempt to secure the chancellory of Fl orence when it
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fell vacant upon the death of the aging chancellor Coluccio
Salutati, or at least to make a name for himself in the Florentine
community . 45

Indeed, there is a strong noteof self-consciousness

in the Panegyric:
Once I had seen this beautiful city ••• I wanted more than
I can tell to try its great beauty and magnificence .
That is why I am writing this Qanegyric--not to curry
favor or win popul ar acclaim. 46
Above all, it is Bruni ' s commitment to Florence' s republican

hi:stit.ut.1 6rt~

that forms the basis of his moral purpose in

writing history.47

He asserts that Florence possessed a civic

virtus, a quality "dependent upon the freedom which allows citizens
, ,
,
'
'
to partlclpate
dlrectly
ln
t h e affalrs
of t h"
elr clty-state ." 48

While the Florentine humanists held to a sense of cultural
superiority based upon Florence's inheritance of the Roman
republican tradition, quattrocento humanism ,was also characterized by a more general consciousness of the inheritance of
Roman antiquity.

There was a feeling that all Italians were

somehow superior to the

bar~barians of ultramontane Europe. 49

This is evident in Bruni's History of Florence, in which he
describes rather gleefully the defeat in 1401 of a German
army,

despite its employ by Florence herself, at the hands

,
,
d'
50
of a Mllanese
army made up of Itallan
sollers.

Armed with a civic-mindedness and a concern with rhetoric ,
how did the humanists go about writing history?

As was dis-

cussed earlier, they borrowed from classical historians in
focusing on important political events.

In its concern with

rhetoric, humanist historiography attempted to demonstrate
how people should act, to teach by example .
the preface to his History:

Writes Bruni in
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If we think men of advanced age are wiser because they
have seen more of life, how much wisdom can history
give us if we read it correctly; for there the deeds
and thoughts of many ages are visible and we can
readily see what to imitate and what to avoid, and
be inspired by the glory of great men to attempt
l ike excellence. 5l
Another concern of the humanists was with causation in
history.

,£

The views of Polybius are relevant here:

The special function of history consists, first in
ascertaining as nearly as possible the words actually
spoken and second, in discovering the cause of the
failure or success of whatever was done or said; for if
only the bare facts about an event are narrated,it may
provide pleasant reading but cannot be of any real benefit,
whiJeif the cause of the event is duly added the study
.. of history becomes fruitful. 52

The humanist view of causation in history differed substantially
from the views of the trecento chroniclers.

The role of divine

providence was greatly diminished; the humanists saw history
as the record of human activity, with human motives, and carried
out by the force of human reason.

The part p J!ayed by indivi.duals ,

parties and states was elaborated to a much greater extent
' h "lstorlans. 53
'
h ad b een by earller
t h an lt

History was seen as

the struggle of individual character, or virtd(and Bruni ' s
civic virtus), against external obstacles, or fortune.

54

But for Bruni, fortune does not have the purposive quality
found in Giovanni Villani's ehronicle, or, for that matter , in
Livy, who simply assumed that fortune was on the side of the
Romans in their efforts to dominate the world.

Fortune in

Bruni's History of Florence has no particular pattern, and it
,
'"
55
rarely assumes major
slgnlflcance.

I n general, the h umanlsts
'

emphasized man's role in forming political institutions and in
'"
,56
polltlcal
lnteractlon
.
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The humanists had learned from classical historians that
a " true history" should be narrated in annalistic form, and many
humanist histories digress to remind the reader of the passing
years.

In the History of 'Florence, Bruni makes partial use of

the annalistic mode.

One reason for the humanists ' diminished

use of this style is that while the Roman republic had annual
consular elections to serve as temporal reference points , Florence ' s
political life had no such annual framework.

57

Another

reason, and a more important one, is that the rigidly annalistic
mode did not always al l ow the historian to develop fully
a theme.

In narrating the story of the rise and fall of

Walter of Brienne, Bruni makes an initial statement that the
year 1340 is important, but then treats the four-year episode
as a single unit within the annalistic framework.
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Bruni

narrates this period, which ends with the expulsion of Walter
from his despotism, in terms of Florence's indomitable will to
maintain its Itepub1ican liberty at a time when many other
Italian communes were threatened internally by tyrannical
regimes .

59

Bruni ' s concern was to teach a lesson with his

narration of this period, and "if history teaches by example ,
.
. d
.
the purpose of hl. story does not requlre
• •.concreteness ln
etal1
• 60
It

It was permissible for Bruni to abandon the annalistic mode if
it constrained him in his citric and rhetorical presentation
of Fl orentine history .
Bruni ' s brand of civic humanism could last only as long
as Florence could use its republican institutions to back its
boast of descent from the Roman republic.

The humanist

tradition continued, though, as Italian despots and even

34

ultramontane kings employed humanists in a variety of capacities ,
,
d'lng t h e role of
lnclu

0

ff lClal
"
h'lstorlograp
,
h er . 61

,
An lllus-

tration of the historical work of this type is Angelo Poliziano's
Pa~ri

CQl1§pi-raG.Y, which was commissioned by Lorenzo de' Medici

around 1480 and narrates the 1478 conspiracy by members of
Florence's Pazzi family and Pope Sixtus

Iv

to murder Lorenzo

and his brother Giuliano and to overthrow the Medici regime(Giuliano
was indeed murdered, but Lorenzo escaped harm and the plot failed) .
Poliziano simplifies hi s story and makes his sympathy and
patronage clear by relating the story as the struggle between
good and evil:
All the Good People were on the side of the brothers
Lorenzo and Giuliano ••• The Pazzi family was hated by
citizens:c: arid common people alike, they were all extremely
greedy, and none could stand their outrageous and insolent
nature. 62
Though the effective diminution of Florence ' s republican institutions under the Medici was

seve~

Poliziano, as it suits his

political purpose in the Pazzi Conspiracy, compares Florence
to ancient republican Rome.

He implies a parallel with the

events of Sallust's Catiline Conspiracy, and indicates that
since Rome had survived a conspiracy, so would Florence.
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Finally, Poliziano makes extremely selective use of facts to
further the propagandistic value of his history.

He entirely

fails to mention Lorenzo's dispute with Sixtus over the city
of Imola, whose control Lorenzo had won, but which each man
' h
h a d wanted essentlally
for 'lmself. 64

The a ccuracy of fl1e humanists also suffered , at times , from
their excessive concern with style.

The self-perception of the

humanist historian was not " as a collector of facts b ut as an

35
artist who organized the facts into a coherent and attractive
form . to

65

Poggio Bracciolini, who as chancellor of Florence from

1453 to 1459 wrote a Florentine History, held a deep veneration
for the classical tradition and a particular admiration for
Livy.

These concerns led him to focus more attention on style

rather than on substance; form, not actual historical matter,
.

was a f paramount lmportance.
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The humanist historiographic tradition did not survive the
fifteenth century entirely intact.

The French invasion of 1494

was a jolt to the humanists' conception of Italian superiority
and to their overweening faith in their pOlitical sagacity
based on classical exempla.

It also necessitated a sharpened

interest in practical politics, since the invasions threatened
directly the very existence of quattrocento civic liberty,
whatever its constitutional form.

The cinquecento was to see

an historiography which, while it borrowed some elements of the
humanist tradition, also diverged sharply from it.
Quattrocento Florentine historical writing was steeped not
only in the quattrocento admiration of classical antiquity, but
in Italian politics itself.

Throughout the fifteenth century,

the workings of Italian politics were known and calculable to
the intelligent observer; those who knew how to balance these
.
..
67
. . .
forces were successful ln POlltlCS .
Pre-humanlst hlstorlography had proceeded, essentially, from the assumption that
history was not within man's control, that fortune or God
were the dominant elements.

The humanists had asserted that

man had the power to influence events, that I1by making use of
experience he could impress efficiency and perfection on the
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political order.,,68

The political events surrounding the

invasions of Italy which began in 1494 were unprecedented, though ,
and action based on past observation and republican "reason"
.
. .
69
caul d n o longer d omlnate P011tlCS.
The victory of French arms over Italian reason for control
in the political arena meant that force, which had previously
been given only a partial role in the determination of events,
had to be seen as the decisive factor in political struggles . 70
The Prince and the Discourses on Livy of Nicco1~ Machiavelli,
the towering Italian political analyst of this period, maRe
"an appeal to recognize the crucial importance of force in
..
7 1 .
.
P011tlCS. "
That the Ita 11ans had lost control of thelr

political destiny also led them to search for an inscrutable
element in politics.

The motives of the ultramontane rulers who now

controlled Italian events were as inscrutable to early cinquecento
Italian historians as God's will had been to their predecessors .
Within the arena of Florentine politics, they fell back on an
analysis of the motives of the great states in terms of the
"personal qualities and inclinations" of their rU1ers. 72

This

sort of " psychological " analysis of pOlitical events would
l ater be taken up by Guicciardini.
The restoration of a republican regime in Florence in 1494
had vast implications for pOlitical and historical thought.
If history were to continue to instruct men in the art of po1itics, it had to take into account the new tensions of
Florentine political life .

The humanist prescription fo r

writing history proved inadequate for the immediate political
analysis made necessary by the unprecedented nature of contemporary
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political events , 73 : and historians of this period adopted new
forms for the writing of history.

The work of Piero Parenti

took the form of a diary , with entries every two or three months .
In it, Parenti took note of the Florentine political scene,
discussing debate over laws, the conduct of magistrate's meetings ,
and shifting alliances among political leaders.

In calling

his work a Florentine History, he apparently felt that h e was
still writing in an historical framework.
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The work of

Bartolomeo Cerretani, whose Florentine History was publi$hed
in 1512, was partially within the humanist tradition .

In the

first part of the work, he employs set speeches , and his intent
is to " give good examples to readers ."

But the second section

of the work, much lengthier than the first , is a detailed description of Florentine politics from 1492 to 1512, focusing
especiallY on events which took place in the councils of the
.

republlc.
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Machiavelli, perhaps more than any other writier of this
period, was aware of these matters of political immediacy .

The

questions he addresses in The Prince and the Discourses on Liyy :
what form of government is best for Florence, the benefits of
mercenary armies and the importance of force were questions
that were being discussed as he wrote.
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Politics was the

tangible reality with which Machiavelli was concerned.

. .

saw polltlCS as an autonomous sphere of

He

h uman actlvlty,
, ..
77 and

employed history only insofar as it could provide fodder for political analysis .

He felt that without a purely -empirical

foundation all insight into the true nature of politics and
comprehension of the laws behind political phenomena were

38

,
'b Ie, 78 t h aug h as we w1ll
'
, , ,
1mposs1
see , h'1S " emp1r1c1sm"
wa s not
as resolute as it might have been when it could not fully
illustrate the laws he sought to discern .

History, then,

subserved his aim of political analysis; he always moved from
the description of historical events to more general considerations.

Each episode of history was seen as a manifestation

of something which was unchanging: the perennial struggle for
,
'"
power, 1n
ot h er war d s, POl1t1cS
1tself . 79

Machiavelli had several aims in his writings .

Foremost

was his desire to earn himself employment in the restored
government of 1512.

Medic~

His service to the republic had made the

Medici suspicious of his political leanings, and he had beeri
expelled from government and even toruu red by Medici leaders .
After 1512, almost all of his writing was done for the e yes
of those who were in a position to facilitate the resumption
'"
'
of h.. 1S
career 1n
pol1t1CS. 80

,
In a letter wr1tten
after the

completion of The Prince in 1513 he expressed
the desire I have that these Medici princes mould begin
to employ me, even if at first it were only something
menial; for if then I did not gain their favor, I should
blame myself. And if they have read this work of mine,
they would see that the fifteen years I have spent in
the study of politics, I have not wasted or gambled away ;
and anyone og ght to be glad to use a man who has gained
a great deal of experQence. 8l
Machiavelli was steeped in the humanist tradition, and
his writings bear a relationship to those of the quattrocento
humanists.

One similarity is the civic nature of his work.

In the Discourses, published in 1520, he writes , fl I believe that
the greatest good one may do and the most pleasing to God is
82'

the good one does to one's native land. "-'

He also felt that

his work could be used as a guide to pol itics by the leaders
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of the city .

In his introduction to The Prince he bases his

authority on "long experience in modern affairs and continual
reading in ancient ones .,, 83

Like the humanists of the quattro-

cento, then, Machiavelli found classical wisdom applicable to
the contemporary world.

The Discourses are a commentary on

the work of a classical author and contain a passage borrowed
,
84
f rom P olyblUS .
Many humanist histories had been commissioned
by governmental leaders, both in Florence and elsewhere.
Machiavel l i's History of Florence was also a commissioned work;
it was undertaken in 1521 upon the request of Cardinal Giu1io
de' Medici, later Pope Clement VII.
prob1ematic~hy-~staunch

republican , accepted a commission whose

terms obviously included favorable
family.

Actually, it is somewhat

portra~

of the Medici

In writing the work, Machiavelli employed the humanist

formulae for omens and battle narratives.

Recently, Felix

Gilbert has suggested t hat Machiavelli used the humanist
form for set speeches to reveal, in disguised fashion, his
,
d"
.
antl-Me
lCl sentlment
. 85

.
.
.
.
Machlave111
attrlbutes
to Plero
de '

Medici(Lorenzo's father, not his son), as his death approached
in 1468, the following speech to his supporters:
I believed myself to be associated with those who would
set some bounds to their avarice, and who, after having
avenged themselves on their enemies and lived in their
country with security and honor, would be satisfied. But
now I find myself greatly deceived, unacquainted with the
ambition of mankind, and least of all with yours; for, not
satisfied with being masters of so great a city, and
possessing among yourselves those honors, dignities and
emoluments which used to be divided among many citizens,
not contented with having shared among a few the property
of your enemies, or with being able to oppress all others
with public burdens, while you yourselves are exempt from
them and enjoy all the public offices of profit, you must
still further load everyone with ill-usage. You plunder
your neighbors of their wealth; you sell justice; you
86
evade the law, you eppress the timid and exalt the insolent ••.
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Machiavelli, while describing such activites by those who
supported the Medici and governed the supposedly republican
institutions of the Medici government, fulfills the terms of
his commission by exonerating Piero himself.

He laments

that Piero's "honorable designs" to check such outrageous
behavior were frustrated by his death.
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In combining certain

aspects of humanist historiography with distinctly un-humanist
criticis m of Florence, Machiavelli i s

.t a

also "a prodigal son who never returned ."

son of humanism," but
88

Machiavelli also departed from the humanist tradition in his
views on the pabterns of causation in history, and on history
itself.

The humanists had seen history as a man-made process ,

controlled by the force of hUman reason .

Machiavelli, however ,

saw history as operating in a predestined direction, not fully
within man's control.

In the History of Florence he posits

a meta-historical framework borrowed from the work of Polybius :
It may be observed, that provinces amid the vicissitudes
to which they are subject, pass from order into confusion,
and and afterward recur to a state of order again ~
for the
nature of mundane affairs not allowing them to continue
in an even course, when they have arrived at their greatest
perfection, they soon begin to decline.
In the same
manner, having been reduced to disorder, and sunk to
their utmost state of depression, unable to descend lower,
they, of necessity, reascend, and thus from good they
gradually decline to evil, and from evil again to
good. The reason is, that v~lor produces peace; peace,
iiepose,;!rrepose, disorder; disorder, ruin; so from disorder
order springs; from order, virtue, and from this, glory
and good fortune. 89
Despite his belief in this cyclical pattern of history,
Machiavell i still gave hUman choice a role in political events .
This idea, and his ideas on fortune are expressed in The Prince:
Many have been and still are of the opinion that the
affairs of this world are so under the direction of
l:c fortune and of God that man's prudence cannot control
"-' them ••• This opinion has been the more accepted
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in our times, because of the great changes in the state
of the world that have been seen and are now seen every
day, beyond all human surmise. Nevertheless ••• I think.
it may be true that fortune is arbiter of half our
actions, but that she still leaves the control of the
other half, or about that, to us. 90
In describing how man might control fortune to the greatest
possible extent, Machiavell i reverts to the role of force
in pOlitics :
I am of the opinion that it is better to be rash than
overcautious because fortune is a woman and, if you
wish to keep her down, you must beat her and pound
her. It is evident that she all~vs herself to be overcome by men who treat her in that way rather than by
those who proceed coldly.9l
Gilbert has speculated that this idea and Machiavelli ' s
ideas on history's cyclical nature were to be the ultimate
point of the History of Florence .

Machiavelli narrates

Florence ' s decline over a period of centuries, and in his own
time Florence appears to be at the nadir of an historical cycle .
Gilbert points out that the History is an unfinished work, and
that Machiavelli presented to Clement VII in 1525 a plan to
arm the people of the Romagna in an attempt to reverse the
gains of foreign rulers in Italy.

Gilbert writes that "it is

not far-fetched to assert that Machiavelli wanted to end the
:tB'ilorentine History as he had ended his other political writings : ••• "
With t he idea that "the despe rate situation in Italy could be
remedied if the Italians themselves took up arms.,,92
Machiavelli the historian remains subject to Machiavelli
the political analyst .

In giving expression to his political

ideas in an essentially humanist mode of historical writing,

.

his history loses loses some of its "historical" flavor .

His

history is diffuse; his focus is on individual episodes which
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'
, 9. 3
h e conSl'ders lll
ustratlve

In proceeding straight from facts

to considerations of a more generainature, he neglects causation
in history.94
an example.

His analysis of the Pazzi conspiracy provides
By way of insight, he writes that plots on the

life of a prince
rarely succeed, and most commonly involve the ruin of
those concerned in them, while they frequently contribute
to the aggrandizement of those agrinst whom they are directed .
Thus the prince of a city attacked by conspiracy, if not
slain(as had been Duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza of Milan ten
years earlier) •••. -... ~ almost always attainsto a greater
degree of power, and w.ery often has his good disposition
perverted to evil • . The proceedings of his enemies give
him cause for fear; fear suggests the necessity of providing for his own safety, which involves the inj ury of
others; and here arise animosities and not infrequently
his ruin. 95
Machiavelli, in deriving his lessons in politics from the
events of history, did not scruple to fit facts to his i '

E

theories, and in his choice of sources a nd events to narrate
he sought facts which best illuminated his political ideas .

96

Given this approach, he overlooks the specific motivations for
the Pazzi conspiracy itself in his desire to glean from it
more general truths.

Even his highly admiring biographer

critic:izes his historical writing for its insisten concern with
politics i

ciS

When people and events leave him indifferent as a man and
as a politician, his narrative dozes off or moves by
c f1~ ts i andi start$ ••. but ·' s t yle and thought revive · miraculously whenever he divines beneath the garb of a Theodoric
or even of a Walter of Brienne h :i's myth of a new prince. 97
Machiavelli ,

remain~

above all, a political analyst, more

, ,
' h
"
,
98
comfortable derlvlng
lessons from hlstory
t an
wrltlng It.

This is due in part to his own ardent interest in politics , but
this interest can also be seen as a product of the period in
which h e wrote .

He wrote as the struggles started by the French
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invasion of 1494 were still being fought and when, in his

awn estimation, political action could still save Italian
liberty.

It was only after the treaties of Barcelona and

Cambrai, which confirmed Italy's domination by ultramontane
powers, that such pOlitical writing lost its immediacy and
history could once again be separated from it .

It was to

be the task of Francesco Guicciardini, writing in the 1530 ' s,
to discuss the history of the invasions as an investigation
into the natural causes of political events .

CHAPTER III
FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI
Francesco Guicc.iardini{1483-1450)wrote his History of Italy ..
in the last years of his life, after the events of the previous
forty years had confirmed Italy's subjection to foreign rulers .
In this work, he approached history in a novel way, developing
a view of history that was unprecedented in the historiography
of the Italian Renaissance . However, to assert as has one
historian that Guicciardini'ss numerous earlier writings were
merely "trial runs"l for his masterpiece is to ignore the
development of an extraordinarily analytical mind in the context
of early cinquecento Italian history.
Guicciardini was born in 1483 into a prominent Florentine
aristocratic family.

He was trained as a lawyer and gave up a

flourishing practice when he was called upon by the republic
to serve as its ambassador to the court of King Ferdinand
Aragon.

of

This appointment, in 1512, was t he beginning of a

long political career.

Unlike Machiavelli he was retained in

the service of the Medici when the family was restored to power ,
largely because his family had traditionally remained aloof
from the partisanship of Florentine politics .

He remained for

a short time Florence ' s ambassador to Spain, but then moved
into the direct employ of the Medici popes .

From 1516 to 1527

he held a number of positions in the papal service; first as
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governor of Modena, Reggio and Parma in papal Romagna, then
as President of the Romagna, and finally as Lieutenant-General
of the papal army which suffered defeat at the hands of E"mperor
Charles V in 1527 .

He was severely ostracized by the Florentine

republic of 1527, but returned to government in 1530 as an
adviser to the Medici dukes.

He left government in 1527 and

worked on the ¥istOl::,Y of ItalY until his death in 1540 . 2
Guicciardini's varied career is reflected by his writing~ His points of view change throughout his career in a

manner which takes into account the varied political scene of
which he was a part.

The despair that characterizes the History

Of Italy reflects his reaction to Italy's sUbjugation to foreign
rule and the political eclipse of the patrician class to which he
belonged .
No Fl orentine thinker of Guicciardini' s time was unaffected by the tradition of quattrocento humanism .
education conformed

clo;~e 1:y

His

to the humanist curriculum, though .

the ancient writers 8 he read most diligently were Rome's
'
,
3
h lstorlans.

Guicciardini was familiar with humanist political

and historical theory and used it in much of his writing.

While

he did not adhere to a l l humanist principles, he used some
of them selectively to shape his work.

He clearly rejected the

dominant element of humanist thought, the uncritical admiration
of Roman antiquity:
How mistaken are those who quote the Romans at every
step. One would have to have a city with exactly the same
conditions as theirs and then act according to their
example. That model is as unsuitable for those lacking
the right qUalities as it is to expect an ass to run like
a horse. 4
Implicit here is also a rejection of the humanists ' confidence
in the use of past examples

to guide conduct, and in the ability
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of contemporary figures to draw lessons from the past, an
aspect of Guicciardini's thought which will be addressed later .
In his early History of Florence, Guicciardini borrows
freely from the humanist tradition of writing history to reinforce
civic pride.

This work, written between 1508 and 1510, " conveys

the sense that the author considers Florence the center around
which events take form and from which events derive their
meaning.,,5

Even after 1494, when Italian politics came to

be dominated by ultramontane powers, Guicciardini still shapes
his narrative around Florence's ongoing effort to recover control
of Pisa.

At this point in his career, Guicciardini approached

his role as an historian in much the same way as had Bruni and
Poggio; history was a civic monument and a celebration of
civic virtue.

6

Like the post-humanist historians discussed

in the l ast chapter, he also saw history as a vehicle of political analysis .

In the History of Florence, he analyzes Florence ' s

history from 1378 to 1509 in terms of governmental forms, and
emerges asanl advocate of oligarchical republicanism, an ideal
restated in his later works that is perhaps the only position
that remained a constant in his thought.
GuGuicciardini came from a long line of Florentine patricians .

His early work derives from loyalty to his family as

well as his his class.

7

He begins the History of Florence

with the statement that "In the year 1378, when Luigi Guicciardini
was Gonfaloniere of Justice, the Ciompi rebellion took place."
He proceeds to narrate Florentine history with an emphasis on
the achievements of it s patrician leaders.

The period from

1393 to 1420 was the political heyday of the aristocracy of

8
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Florence .

About this period he writes that"'Florence was

successful both at home and abroad; at home, because it remained
free, united, and governed by well-to-do, good and capable men. ,, 9
He w:asdisdainful of republican government by 1!.the people," whom
he was later define as If t a ·s mad, wild creature, full of infinite
errors and confusion, without judgment, loyalty, or stability."lO
On the Florentine republic in 1497, he writes ·;·. that the government
of the city "was in great disorder.

The Great Council preferred

to fill all offices with good and common people who would
cause no trouble rather than with citizens who had more
' .
au th or 1't y and experlence
• ,,11

Guicciardini is also critical of

Nedici ascendancy in Florence, and l i!aments the erosion of
,
,
'h
'
llbertles
durlng
t elr
rule. 12

Guicciardini formally elucidates his principles for the
government of Florence in his Discourse of Logrogno, written
during his embassy to Spain.

In this work, he proposes a govern-

ment for Florence on the Venetian model, with a gonfaloniere
elected for life, a senate, composed of aristocrats, which
would initiate all legislation and control the government's
treasury, and a grand council with the power to affirm or
reject the senate's proposals.

This constitution, which is

composed of elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy,
also corresponds to the ideas of Aristotle and Polybius and
"
"
dlffers
llttle from Machlavelll'
s

1'deal

'
ln
t h e D'lscourses 13.
'.';and

from his own proposal for a Florentine polity drawn up for
Pope Leo X.

However, Guicciardini bases his views on govern-

ment not upon admiration for classical antiquity, seeing

them
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,
lnstead
as a

d
tf

'
, ,
emand of ratlonal
efflclency
.tf 14

In his Dialogue on the Government of Florence, written in

1520, Guicciardini proposes once more this same formula for
government in an historical analysis characteristic of the
post-humanist tradition.

This work contains none of the idealism

or certainty of humanist treatises; rather, it analyzes political personalities in terms of their "capacity to use the possibilities
, h erent ln
'h
"
,
,
h'lCh t h ey confront. 15
ln
t e polltlcal
sltuatlorr'w

He

strips politics of the moral goals and imperatives prescribed
by the humanists, and develops the concept of "reasons of state "
to justify political action.

In contrast with the studied

ambivalence toward Lorenzo de ' Medici which he had shown in the
History of Florence, in the Dialogue Guicciardini is highly
laudatory of Lorenzo, whom he sees as having governed very
'
'
,
capab ly ln
t h e sltuatlons
.h e f ace d • 16

G'
,
d'lnl, was aware
U1CClar

of the demands of politics; one of the characters in the Dialogue
speaks of harsh measures taken by Florence against Pisa
acknowledges that "he has not spoken as a Christian but according
to the reason of state."

17

While he was writing the Dialogue

Guicciardini was serving the papacy as governor of Modena
and Reggio, and his views were largely derived from his
experiences there.
del

Medici ~~

In a letter written to Cardinal Giulio

during the same period, he describes his attempts

to act justly in his post, writing that "I have not shown
favor e xcept when forced to by needs of state . ,,18
Despite his recognition of these "needs of state, " Guicciardini
never longed for a prince who would serve as the redeemer of
Italy .

Instead he remained a staunch advocate of an', aristocraticallY
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led republic .

In his Considerations on the Discourses of

Machiavelli of 1530 he writes that
•• • if it were necessary to give a city a government e ither
of nobles or of plebs, I believe it would be better to
choose the nobles, for as they have greater prudence and good
qualities, one may hope that they will evolve some
reasonable constitution, whereas a people full of ignorance
and confusion, and possessing ... many bad qualities, can
only be expected to overthrow and destroy everything. 19
This theme is recapitulated in the History of Italy, where
Guicciardini writes that since "those citizens of greatest
quality and esteem were held in less esteem than seemed proper ,"
the republic in 1497 had failed to make " provisions of moderation"
(i.e. inclusi IDn of optimates in the government)which would
"prevent the republic from being thrown into disorder by the
.
.
d e." 20
19norance
of the multltu

Guicciardini remains a

quintessentially elitist aristocrat.
Despite Guicciardini ' s differences from

p~evious

Florentine

thinkers, Guicciardini the political analyst must still
placed withan the post-humanist tradition.

ba

His sympathies

remained essentially republican, as opposed to the courtly
sycophancy reflected by others at the time.

His interweaving

of politics and history was also commonplace in this period .
It is Guicciardini's historical thought which reveals his
departure both from humanist historiography and its Machiavellian
sequel.
"Smal l

and insignificant beginnings," writes Guicciardini,

" are often the origin of very great disasters, or even great g·ood
fortune, hence it is extremely prudent to notice and
well everything, however small . Jt 2l

ponder

This belief led him to see

every event in history as causally significant .

The systematic
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study of cause and effect is an essential feature of Guicciardini ' s
historiographical vision, and one that distinguishes him from
his predecessors.

Even in his early History of Florence, in

his description of the Pazzi conspiracy, Guicciardini is concerned with historical c causation and effect.

He describes

in considerable detail the conflict over Imola which aroused
the enmity of the pope and the Pazzi family toward Lorenzo
de' Medici . 22

He also seeks to understand how, when alternatives

existed, Lorenzo's enemies came to decide to assassinate him
in order to overthrow his government I
In their discussion 6f t the best way t o realize their
objective, the conspirators decided t hat a war against
Florence would not be suitable, for it would take too
long and would be too dangerous and uncertain. Besides ,
other Italian powers would surely come to the aid of the
23
city. There was only one way, and that was to kill Lorenzo .
Guicciardini shows a similar concern with causation in
assessing the outcome of the conspiracy :
This tumult nearly cost Lorenzo his power and his life ;
and yet he gained so much :reputation and profit from it
that the day may be called a lucky one for him. His
brother Giuliano, with whom he would have had to divide
hi s property and contend for power, was now dead ••. his
power became such that from then on h e acted as a fre e
and complete arbiter, indeed almost as lord of the city .
His power, which until that day had been great but
suspect, was now supreme and safe.
That is the way civil discora and strife end : the one
side is exterminated, the head of the other becomes
lord of the city. His supporters and adheI"ents, once
companions, become almost subjects; the people and
the multitude become slaves; power is passed on by
inheritance and very often it passes from a wise man 24
to a madman who then plunges the city into the abyss .
There is a clear difference between Machiavelli's
assessment of the conspiracy, described in the last chapter ,
and Guicciardini's account.

Machiavell i begins his description

of the conspiracy with a general statement about conspiracie&

51
their usual failure, and their results .

He uses the specific

example of the Pazzi conspiracy, devoid of details which would
detract from his point,
in question.

to illustrate the political principle

On the other hand, Guicciardini describes the

events and then draws his more general conclusions, which,
upon close examination, are not so general as they may seem.
refers specifically to Lorenzo's consolidation of power and
its inheritance by Piero, whom he chooses to label a "madman."
His entire account of the conspiracy derives "from his mental
habit of looking at history with an eye for explanations :
events are viewed as the results of a series of causes, and
·
then as t h e causes of a furt h er serles
of effects." 25

A

final difference is that while Machiavelli makes an implicit
reference to the assassination of Duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza
twelve years earlier, Guicciardini make s no such use of
examples.
Indeed, Guicciardini holds none of his predecessors '
enthusiasm for the notion that history can, or should, teach
by example.

He constantly stresses the singular nature of

each episode in history .

In discussing the Italian reaction

to the presence of King Charles VIUin Italy, Guicciardini
mentions that Pope Alexander VI informed Charles through a
papal legate that he desired to see the French king out of
Italy at once, and the removal of the newly-installed French
bureaucracy out of Naples.

"Otherwise, " writes Guicciardini,

he would have to appear personally before the Pope at
Rome under those spiritual penalties with which the
Church makes its threats .
Such a remedy had been previously attempted by popes

He
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in ancient times ••• But since there was now lacking
that reverence and majesty which -the sanctity of the
popes' lives had aroused in men's hearts, it was ridiculous to expect similar effects from such dissimilar
manners and examples. 26
Another instance in which Guicciardini questions the use of
past examples by historical figures is his treatment of the
journey undertaken by Piero de' Medici in 1494 to negotiate
with Charles VIII, whose armies had reached the borders of the
Florentine contado.

Piero based his trip upon his father

Lorenzo ' s successful negotiations with King Ferrante of Naples
when in the aftermath of the Pazzi conspiracy, the two powers
had been at war.

In the History of Florence, Guicciardini

writes that Piero attempted to follow his father's example
despite the fact that "this time the circumstances were
different and the trip made little sense . ,,27 By the time
Guicciardini finished his Ricordi(maxims ) in 1530, events had
made him extremely unsure of man's ability to guide his action
by past: exampl::e :~ple:
It is entirely fallacious to judge by examples, for
if they are not alike in every detail they are useless,
since every slightest variation in the case makes
a very great difference in the result, and to distinguish
these minute differgnces requires a very keen and
perspicacious eye. 2
At this point in his life Guicciardini, while stressing
the times are quite different from the past, still believes
that it is within human capacity to discern these "minute
differences" between situations.

By the time he wrote the

Hist_o ry _ofItaly, he had abandoned even this possibility .
Piero's trip, he writes that
governing oneself by examples is undoubtedly very
dangerous if similar circumstances do not correspond ,
not only in general but in all particulars, and of
other things are not managed with similar judgment,

On
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and if, aside from all other fundamentals, one does
not have similar good fortune on one's side. 29
Fortune, indeed, plays a sizeable role in Guicciardini ' s
History of Italy, as he found these events explicable in no
other terms.

He had long been inspired by his belief in man:' s

power to control events and in his own talent to manage his
affairs .

Thereforethe events of 1527 were a shock to him,as

well as to all who believed in the ability of Italian reason to
control history.30

Moreover, the restoration of the : r eptiblic

in Florence in 1527 was a personal disaster for Guicciardini.
Because of this association with the Medici he sUffered a
variety of indignities at the hands of the Republic.

He was

at first proscribed from service to the new government, then
had much of his personal wealth confiscated by the governmente
The imprisonment of Pope Clement VII in the Castel Saint
Angelo in Rome had been the event which caused the downfall of
Medici rule in Florence and gave

rise to the restored republic .

In the History of Italy, this event is described with reference
to fortUne.

When Guicciardini has occasion, earlier in the

work, to mention the pope when he was still Cardinal Giulio
de' Medici, he notes that the cleric's ecclesiastical career

.
31
"was to prove a notable example of the vagarles of fortune."
The loss of Italian liberty engendered by the 'outcome
of the invasions produced in Guicciardini a profound sense of
resignation and defeat.

While in the History of Florence

Guicciardini states only briefly the events surrounding the
imprisonment of Ludovico Sforza in the tower of Bourges by
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King Louis XII of France after Louis had made himself Duke
of Milan, his comments on these events in the History of Italy
reflect both the despair and the sense of irony, found e specia11y in the Ricordi, which-I't_alY's(:de:fea'L had instilled in him.
Guicciardini writes that Sforza was sent to the castle of
Bourges,
which had been, two years earlier, the prison of the very
same king who was now imprisoning him: so varied and
miserable is human destiny and so uncertain to everyone
are his own conditions in times to come. 3 2
One historian has argued that the strongest impression
-~- ~"l .!.

Gthcciardini meant to impart in the History of Italy .. is that of
the helplessness and impotence of man in the face of fate .,,33
While this impression is present, as illustrated above, to term
it Guicciardini's major point is to overstate the case.

There

is no sense of inevitability in the events which lead to the
foreign domination of Italy.

Guicciardini opens each book of

the History of Italy by showing that there was renewed hope
for peace, although war always resumes and the increasing
,
,
d'
,
,
34
'
d esperatlon of Italy's p1lght lS rea lly dlscernlb1e.

Nonetheless, even as late as 1527, when the sack of Rome was
imminent, Guicciardini had not abandoned hope.

He is extremely

specific in demonstrating how poor military preparation and
Pope Clement's confidence in an untrustworthy commander doomed
the defense of Rome against the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V.
Guicciardini exp1icitJ:y rejects a deterministic view of
history.

The workings of fortune are truly unfathomable a nd

not subject to the one-dimensionality of fortune common to
fourteenth-century chronicles or to a meta-historical pattern
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such as Machiavelli ' s .

Writes

Guic~iardini:

It is a great mistake to speak of the affairs of this
world without distinction and absolutely, and, so to say,
by rule; as every case is different and exceptional because
of the variety and circumstances which cannot be judged
by the same measure. Such distinctions and exceptions
are not written in books but must be revealed by
discernment. 36
The "discernment" to which Guicciardini alludes is taken up
in his study of causes and effects of particular events and,
as will be shown below, his study of the motives of historical;
figures .

The rest he leaves up to fortune.

In one sense, then,fortune plays a large part in Guicciardini ' s
historical analysis.

I n another sense , however, its role as

an explanatory force is small.

On the 1495 Battle of Fornovo,

he writes:
•• • the power of fortune is most great in all hUman affairs,
even more in military matters than any others; where a badly
understoo d command, or a poorly executed order, or an
act of rashness or a false rumor, sometimes coming from
even the simplesfsoldier, will often bring victory to
those who already seem to be defeated; and where unnumerable
accidents unexpectedly occur which cannot be foreseen or
controlled by the captain's orders. 37
In this specific instance, a sudden turn of interest among
Italian soldiers from fighting the French to plundertf.il.g, their
camp, and the contagion of this spirit through the Italian
army, is attributed to fortune.

On another occasion, the

thick fog which hung over Rome before its sack in 1527 and
thus made it easy for the foreign armies to capture the city
is also explained in terms of fortune.

38

Guicciardini, in

fact , questions fortune's true explanatory value within the
text of the History of Italy itself.

Charles VIII, in his

conquest of the Florentine contado in 1 494, was able to capture
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the fortress of Sarzana despite its extremely strong fortifications.

Writes Guicciardini : "It was ordained, wl'Ether by

good fortune or at the orders of some higher power(if man ' s imprudence and faul:tin

deserve such excuses) that a sudden

.
.
.
remedy would lntervene
t o remove thlS
obstacle. 1t 39 T wo lmportant

facets of Guicciardini ' s thought can be discerned here.

The

first is that he attributes the military victory of the ultramontane ruler to Charles' own good fortune, not to the bad
fortune of the Florentines .

Guicciardini is clearly quite far

removed from the exclusively civic orientation of humanist
historiography and his own early work.

The second is that

Guicciardini expresses concern about the limits of fortune ' s
explanatory power, questioning even his awn use of it.

That

"fortune is invoked only as a last resort" is "the result of
his determination to see human affairs in terms of man."

40

On the very first page of the History of Italy Guicciardini
informs the reader that
Numerous examples will make it plainly evident how
mutable are human affairs, • • • and how pernicious, almost
always to themselves but always to the people are those
ill-advised measures of rulers who act solely in terms
of what is in front of their eyes: either foolish errors
or short-sighted greed. 41
Mark Phillips makes the important observation that twentiethcentury historians seek broad explanations of major historical
events, "and for that reason we may be inclined to see the
princes as the scapegoats rather than the true culprits of
history . ,,42

But Guicciardini, he points out, held a view of

history based on particular factors, and especially upon
personalities .

"Psychology and self-interest," writes Phillips,

"guide the flow of events in the History.

For Guicciardini,
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then, princely cupidity is a perfectly serious explanation
and it is backed up by a clear picture of the psychology of
rUlers . "

43

Describing Charles V in the aftermath of the Battle

of Pavia, Guicciardini writes that
As far as one could understand from external signs , the
Emperor's actions appeared clearly to indicate a very
moderate state of mind: a man not easily swept away by
his good luck, an attitude that seemed incredible "' in
so powerful and young a prince, who had never known
anything but felicity.44
Here , Guicciardini expresses surprise at moderation on the
part of any i Nexperienced and victorious prince , especiallY
.
.
.
.
glven • t h e lnsolence
wh'lCh commonly accompanles
vlctorles
. " 45
•

t

Moreover, his use of the term "state of mind" illustrates the
depth of his interest in the psychological explanation of
events .

Indeed, one of the great achievements of the History

of Italy in the sphere of Italian historiography is Guicciardini t s
establishment of "a close causal connection between history
and human psychology'? "

46

One feature of the mind-set of princes which Guicciardini
investigates is ambition.
role in shaping events .

To ambition he attributes a large
He says that King Ferrante of Naples

desired peace in Italy before 1494 "despite the fact that
quite often in the past he had revealed ambitions not conducive to maintaining the peace," 47 and describes Ludovico
..
48
Ambition continues
S forza as "restless and ambltlouS ."
be a prominent cause of Italy's woes .

to

According to Guicciardini ,

the :-.fundarrtental cause of the resumption of war in Italy in
1521 , after three years of peace, was the " ambition of two
most mighty kings ( Francis I and Charles V), puffed up with
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with mutual

jealousie~which

incited them to exercise all

their disdain in Italy.,,49
Guicciardini doe s not think that ambition per se is a
bad quality .

The nature of a person' s ambition is the important

factor;
Ambition is not to be condemned, nor should one revile
the ambitious man's desire to gain glory by honorable
and worthy means.
Such men as these do great and outstand;:~-::ar.d:.ng
things, and anyone who lacks this urge is inc 1 ined
rather to idleness than to effort. Ambition is pernicious
and detestable when its sole end is power. This is
usually true of those princes who, when they set it
up as an idol to achieve what will lead them to power
set aside conscience, honor, humanity, and all else. 50
Anbbher

o~

Guicciardini's primary concerns was motivations

of actors in history, and he takes great pains to discover
the reasons for their actions.

Beforelte wrote the History of

ItalyIhe wbrked briefly on a "Commentary"-;.vhwhich was to b e an
account of his awn involvement in the affairs of 1525-27,
and was later incorporated into the History of Italy!,

In it

he describes the purpose of writing history :
The true value of history consists more in understanding
the motives and the origins of things than in knowing
the effects ••• What actually happened is well-known to
everyone whereas the origins and motives are hidden . 5l
A moment of reflection on what he had written must have led
Guicciardini to abandon his commentary in favor of the History
Ofltaly.

Given his interest in "the origins of things U the

work at hand would have been insufficient for his full understanding of t .he events of 1525-27; he felt he had to return
to before the beginning of the invasions to seek an explanation
for Italy ' s ruin. The interest in motivation expressed here is
also plainly evident in the History .

Seeking an-jexplanation
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of Piero de ' Medici ' s decision to oppose Charles VIII ' s designs
on the kingdom of Naples in 1494, Guicciardini attributes it
to piero's belief that King Ferrante's stable hold on Naples
could be a prop for his own control over Florence. 52

Although

Guicciardini frequently ultimately attributes the actions of rul ers
to ambition or cupidity, he also trie-g· tbe understand their
motives in terms of their specific designs and interests.
Ludovico's invitation to the French is seen as princely folly,
but Guicciardini extends his analysis and perceives Sforza's
actions as part of an intricate design:
•.• his plan was, once he had made himself Duke of Milan
a nd brought the FrencharrDJY into Tuscany, to then interpose
and bring about some agreement, whereby Alfonso would
acknowledge himself tributary to the crown of France
with suitable guarantees to the king, and after having
dismembered perhaps the lands which the Florentines
held in Lumigiana, the king would then return to France .
"
Thus the Florentines would have been beaten; the King
of Naples weakened in force and authority; and he;
Ludovico, having become Duke of Milan, would have
achieved as much as was necessary to maintain his
security without the impending danger of a French
victory.53
For Guicciardini, "personal interest is the mistress that

'
d rlves
all men." 54

He describes the peace in Europe in 1518

and Pope Leo X's plan to bring together the rulers of Europe
in a crusade against the westward-expanding Ottoman Empire:
Everyone declared himself to be against the Turk and to
be ready(if the others concurred)to lend all their strengths
to so just a cause, nevertheless, since each of them
considered the danger uncertain and very far off, and
relating more to one state than to another, and since
it was very difficult, and required a long time to
introduce such a sense of zeal to so universal a union,
private inEerests and advantages prevailed. 55
Here Guicciardini' s idea that "self-interest-the satisfaction
of the particolare--was basic to man's nature, and its only
permanent element,"

56

is given application.

Myron.' Gilmore,
.-~ .~-
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in his general Renaissance history The World of Humanism. 14531517, entitles the chapter of the period of the invasions of
It aly

"The Partlcu1ar
.
I nterests of the Crlstlan
h'"
Prlnces ." 5 7

This could well have served as a subtitle for Guicciardini' s
History of Italy, a work which "reveals a state of affairs in
which the element of self-interest runs amuck on an inter.

. 58

natlona1 scale."

Guicciardini ' s retrospective history of the invasions of
Italy began as a work 9 entitled Florentine Affairs, in which
he intended narrate a parochial, Florentine view of the Italian
tragedy.

By his later years he had realized that it would not

be possible to treat these affairs without a much broader,
Italian scale.

59

It has been observed that a reading of the

History of Italy leaves open the question of the author's
native city; Florence itself has a large but not disproportionate
. the narratlve.
.
60
place ln

In addition, Guicciardini brings

into his work the affairs of all of Europe insofar as they
affect occurrences in Italy:
Perhaps it would seem beyond the bounds of my proposal
not to deal with events occurring outside of Italy, if
I make mention of what happened in France in that same
year(1512); but because our concerns are affected by
what has happened there, and because the successes of
one are often conjoined with the successes and decisions
of the other, I cannot pass over French events in
silence. 61
While in the History of Italy Europe may be a " thin, fitful
.
. d lnl's
. .
..
presence," 62 GUlcclar
recognltlon

0f

the nee d t

0

t ranscen d

the history of a single city-state is a great departure from
the historiographic tradition he had inherited.
There are other respects in which Guicciardini takes
leave of the humanist and Machiavellian historiographic
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prescriptions from which he emerged .

Humanist historians

made l ittle use of documentary materials, usually relying
upon a single source of their choosing.

Not believing that

archives were particularJ;y useful for their purposes, they
consulted only documents that were readily available to
them. 63

Guicciardini, on the other hand, made use of

documents throughout his career as an historian.

He had

used family archives in composing his History of Florence .

64

In his Florentine Affairs he used fifteen previous histories
as well as his father's papers and the Commissiori of Rinatdo
degli Albizzi, a Florentine leader in the pre-Medici era . 65
He had with him as he wrote the History of Italy the entire
archives of the Dieci, the organ of Florentine government
,,66
responsl'b Ie for forelgn
POllCY.

His biographer writes

that in composing the History of Italy, "Guicciardini used
documents with a method more rigorous than any had done
b efore h I' m an d few d'ld after . " 67

Though Guicciardini surpassed humanist historiography in
certain respects, he was also

~ery

'much in its debt.

He

intended to write a "true history;" on a page opposite the
text of his original manuscript are excerpted the sentences
'
,
, ,
on h lstorlcal
wrltlng
foun d"ln Clcero's De Oratore . 68

In

addition, one may speculate as to whether he would have
adopted his broad Italian perspective and mentioned European
affairs had not humanist s historiography emphasized foreign
,

affalrs .

69

Guicciardini, however, is clearly

aware

of the limita-

tions of a number of aspects of humanist historiography, and
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modifies or qUalifies t heir use on frequent occasions .

He

uses the classical-humanist technique of inventing speeches and
attributing them to historical figures, but on the first such
occasion in the History of Italy he attributes the speech to
its orator only tt in substance," admitting conscientiously to
his readers that he has made up the speech.~O

He uses the

familiar annalistic form in the History, but the change of
years is not given much significance when it does not correspond
to important events, and his references to each new year
rarely coincide with his division of the work into twenty
b ooks . 7 1..
separate

Unlike the humanists , Guicciardini is relatively unconcerned
with the literary qualities of his work .

He writes in long

sentences, but they are not the balanced and periodic sentences
of his humanist predecessors.

Indeed, his prose tends to

"stretch continuity and attention to the breaking p oint ...

72

Th e following sentence, in which Guicciardini describes the
fears of Italian leaders in the aftermath of the Battle of Pavia ,
constitutes an entire paragraph ;
They were less reassured by what many divulged regarding
the good intentions of the Emperor, and of his inclination
toward peace, and not to usurp the states of others,
than terrorized by considering the great danger that he,
moved either by ambition which ordinarily is natural among
princes, or by the insolence which commonly accompanies
victories, and spurred likewise by the hotheadedness of
those who governed his affairs in Italy, and finally
by the persuasions of his council and court, would on
such anoccasion(which was sufficient to kindle the coldest
spirit)turn his thoughts toward making himself lord of
all Italy; knowing how easy it is for every great prince ,
and most of all for a Roman emperor, to justify his
enterprises with . appearances that seem honest and
reasonable. 73
Plodding sentences such as these are not the result of
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Guicciardini's inability to express himself clearly.

On t he

contrary, they reveal his desire to control his analysis and
make the truths he discovers as precise as possible.

74

The

humanist historiographers had been professional writers.

In a

work such as Bruni's Panegyric to the City of Florence or his
didactic History of Florence, the force of the rhetoric, and
hence the style, we r e central concerns.

Machiavelli wanted

to make his derived political laws memorable, so he wrote in
a witty and acerbic style.

Guicciardini ' s concerns were

only accuracy and exhaustive detail.
A frequent humanist ornamental technique was the inclusion
of omens which preceded battles and other momentous events,
which were used to foreordain theahBTIcffs of success or failure .
Guicciardini himself employs this convention.

During Charles

VIII's preparations to invade Italy, Guicciardini relates, "in
Puglia one night, three suns appeared in the sky."

Thus, .. the

v ery heavens" were involved in'predicting the future woes of
Italy .,, 75

Clearly, though, Guicciardini -w: iews this literary

device as excess humanist stylistic baggage; in his own
mind he had rejected the value of extra-rational portents ,
Philosophers, theologians, and all the others who
examine things unseen or beyond nature, talk all kinds
of nonsense, because in fact men . are in the dark over
these matters, and this investigation has served and
still serves to exercise the intellect rather than to
discover the truth. 76
For Guicciardini, the truth lies not within the realm
of the extra-rational, nor in the patterns which lie beneath
the historical process , because no such patterns exist .

He

offers none of the lessons or prescriptions with which the
humanists had infused their histories .

One lesson he does
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offer is a demonstration of the mutability of history, but
this is seen as a given and not subject to human control

He

instead turns his narrative to the affairs of individual s,
and is led to his conclusions about human selfishness and the
folly of princes .

In focusing his attention on the causes and

effects of human motivation, "Guicciardini offers us the
Explanatory force of the narrative itself, and the explanation
of the Italian collapse is the History of Italy. " 77

CHAPTER IV
THE MIRROR OF FEUDALISM:
FRENCH VERNACULAR HISTORIOGRAPHY, 1200-1477
The French late medieval historiographic tradition differed
greatly from the Italian historiography discussed earlier.
Throughout much of the medieval period, however, the two traditions had been essentially the same.

As was the case in Italy,

early French historiography was the work of clerics writing in

. 1
L atln.

Moreover, it shared with its Italian counterpart an

all-embracing, universal view of Christian history, concerned
with "the lines of succession from the holy apostles and the
periods that have elapsed from our saviou15's time to our own.,,2
This type of history survived through the thirteenth century
and beyond, but was eventually eclipsed by vernaCUlar histories
which treated we11-circumscr:iibed areas rather than narrating a
universal history.,;,3

This shift has been attributed to the

"Ockhamist Crisis" of the fourteenth century, which called into
question the applicability of all universal frameworks.

4

However,

the tradition of French vernacular historiography began a
century earlier, with Geoffrey of Vi11ehardouin's The Conquest
of Constantinople, a history of the Fourth Crusade.

Subsequent

vernaCUlar histories took a variety of forms, but they had an
important feature in common.

They were for and about the

noble classes of the feudal world.
65

Perhaps, then, it is a
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rising self-consciousness among the feudal nobility which
stimulated this new historiography, for, as will be shown later,
the decline of the French nobility at the end of the Hundred
Years' War marked the end of this type of history.
This historiography was above all concerned with chivalry,
which Johan Huizinga defines as "a sublime form of secular lL'ife .,, 5
This emphasis is discernible throughout these works ; we read
of ga l lant feats of arms and fidelity to the feudal bond .
Feudal knights were constantly at war.

It was not only an

obligation, it also provided diversion in an idle and mono,
6 and was h'19h1y celebrated.
tonous llfe,

,
,
In reflectlng
thls

feature of French life, medieval French historians glorify
knightly bravery and virtues.

Writes Huizinga,

The conception of chivalry constituted for these authors
a sort of magic key, by the aid of which they explained
to themselves the motives of politics and history. The
confused image of contemporaneous history being too much
complicated for their comprehension, they simplified it, 7
as it were, by the fiction of chivalry as a moving force .
This point, however, must not be overstated.

These authors

merely reflected the goings-on in French noble society.

Each

of these authors also had his own reasons for writing history,
and his work was colored as much by these particularities as
it was by the chivalric ideal.

In all cases, though, the under-

lying admiration for and celebration of chivalry is evident.
Villehardouin's The Conguest of Constantinople, written
in the first or second decade of the thirteenth century, has
been the subject of much controversy among historians.
Villehardouin, the Marshal of Champagne, was an important
figure in the Fourth Crusade .

The subject of his role in the

decision of the crusaders to divert their mission from Syria
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to Zara and to the Byzantine Empire, which resulted in the conquest
of Christian territory by the crusaders, is a much-debated one . 8
It seems, though, that Villehardouin di'd deliberately omit from
his chronicle information about the decision tv divert the
crusade which may have cast a negative light on his own role
in the affair .
Villehardouin, like many lay chroniclers, was a member of
a feudal nobility which was largely unaware of Latin learning
and the Latin universal history.9

Villehardouin's style derives

largely from the popular forms of the chansons de geste
the traditional epic.

The

soldiers ~:dn

and

Villehardouin's work

fight not for eternal glory but for earthly merit, which derives
from the fulfilment of thefauda~' chivalric ideal.

lO

Hi s

imitation of the epic form may be unconscious, as the entire
crusading army may well have identified itself with the popular
literature of the times and measured the ir successes and reverses
.
.
h eroes. 11
agalnst
t h ose of eplc

In a device familiar to the

reader of French epic works, Villehardouin frequently employs
hyperbole in his description of the crusade f'.g "Neyer was so
great an enterprise undertaken by any people since the creation
of the world.,,12

Villehat"douin's style also reveal an affinity

with the prose conte, an epic tale of imagined or real knightly
· ·
.
h erOlCS,
reclted by professlonal
story-tellers. 13

Th e text of

Villehardouin's work contains many devices widely used in the
oral presentation of such epics .

Transitional phrases such

as "Now let us for this present speak of them no further but
.

.

speak of the pllgrlms,"

14

I

••

or the omnlpresent antlclpatory phrase

"as you will shortly hear" were commonplace in the prose conte.
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The Conquest of Constantinople was not an imagined story, but
the narration of an

~ctual

crusade, and a failed one at that .

Thus, as the narrative progresses and both author and reader
are made increasingly aware of the failure of the crusade,
Villehardouin's enthusiasm diminishes;

Villehardouin changes

his tone to a more strictly narrative one. 15

The book ends

a p ruptlyand arbitrarily as the author can find no conclusion
appropriate to the epic format .
The prime mover'

in Villehardouin's history was God.

His use

of divine will to explain events was formulaic and common to

16
·
crusa d e c h ronlcles.

The crusades were, after all, , holy missions ,

and to their own minds the crusaders acted with the protection of
God .

When the outnumbered French crusaders defeat a Greek army ,

Villehardouin writes . " ••• our Lord orders battles as it pleases
him.

By his grace and by his will, the

Greeks. ,,17

~ ranks

vanquished the

Villehardouin did not, however, attribute all

actions actions undertaken by the crusaders to God's will .
Only those who were on the "right" side, in Villeh'ardouin ' s
biased reminiscence of the crusade, were guided by divine will .
Villehardouin argues that the crusade could not proceed to the
holy land because some of the barons who had taken the cross
sailed from Flanders instead of Marseilles , and thus the
crusaders were unable to meet the terms of the contract they
had undertaken with the Venetians, who were to transport the
crusading army to the h oly land.

God had nothing to do with

the decision by these barons to sail from Flanders; Villehardouin
attributes actions of which he disapproves to human failure and
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.

.

,• 111-advlce ."

18

of the crusade .

.

.

..

Thelr actlons were contrary to the dlvlne purpose
According to Vi11ehardouin they failed Christen-

dam by sailing from northern ports.

19

Their actions are also contrary to their feudal obligations,
which for Vi11ehardouin are bound closely to religious ones . 20
Thus Vi11ehardouin writes of these "misguided" crusaders: ..... i11
did they keep the fait h they had sworn to the count"(Ba1dwin
of Flanders, one of the leaders of the crusade).21

Throughout

T.he Conquest of Constantinople, Vi11ehardouin shows an obsessive
concern with loyalty to feudal obligations.

He mentions a group

of nobles who went dire ctly to Syria ahd vowed to return, but
22
he makes no mention of their successes or failures. We only
Tead that they did not return and thus failed to keep their
oath •

Vi11ehardouin defends the brutal sack of Zara, a Christian

.
t
Cl. t y, b Y re f errlng

0

.
b'
.
23
t h e company' s compe111ng
o11gatlons.

The defeat of the crusading army in their siege of Adrianop1e
is attributed to the failure of some segments
"keep to what h ad been

s~:tt1ed

of the army to

.
b efore ." 24
the nlght

T h e theme

of faithlessness to the feudal bond(traison)was a frequent
one in the epics whose style Vi11ehardouin borrowed, as was
· on reputatlon
.
d lscernl
.
. b 1e t h roug h out hlS
. work . 25
t h e emp h aS1S
The failure of men is seen as the failure of the religious and
feudal underpinnings of the chivalric ideal.

When the booty

from the final sack of Constantinople i s being collected,
Vi11ehardouin writes:
Some brought in loyall~ and some brought in evil sort(i . e .
they kept some of the booty for themselves), because
covetousness, which is the root of all evil, let and
hindered them ••• Ah Godl how loyally t hey had borne themselves up to now. 26
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Villehardouin, it is true, proceeds from the assumption
that the sack of Constantinople, indeed the entire conduct
of the crusade, was justifiable and divinely sanctioned.

It

is within this framework that he discusses the actions of those
who took the cross .

While he may not have consciously measured

the actions of the crusaders against the codes of chivalry, the
heroes of The Con9uest of Constantinople, if there are any at all,
are those who s served God and fulfilled their feueal bond with
the most loyalty and faith.
Villehardouin's emphasis on the character of the feudal
nobility, while clearly recognizable, is not overt .

His work

was predominantly a history of a military expedition, and an
apologia for

actions that certainly were called into question

by many of his contemporaries.

Later chronicles were more forth-

right in their emphasis on the chivarrous calling of the feudal
nobility.

An example of such a work is Jean of Joinville's

History of Saint Louis, which is in part a personal crusade
chronicle and in part a flattering portrait
of France .

of King Louis IX

Joinville, like Villehardouin, was a noble from

the Champagne region of France.

He took the cross with King

Louis in 1248 and returned to France in 1254 .

In the 1270's

he began to write a chronicle of the Egyptian crusade .

The

~

scope of his work was expanded when in 1298, during the process
of Louis;!; canonization, he was asked by the French queen Jeanne
of Navarre to write a book containing "the holy words and good
L OU1S."
.
26
·
deeds of S alnt-

part work .

Joinville's History became a three-

The first section is a portrait of the saintly

j",,, ,'

sovereign, the second is a narrative of the crusade itself, and
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the third is a summary of able administrative decisions made
by the king after his return to France .
Joinville's chronicle, however, is l ess a work about Louis
IX himself than it is about the noble class and the fulfillement
'"
of the 0 b llgat10ns
of ch1valry by those wh 0 took the cross. 27

JoinvilEasserts at the outset of his History that this would
be his concern(Oddly, the division he proposes differs from
the structure of the finished work) : "The first part telleth
how he ruled himself all his days by God and the Church, and to
the profit of his realm.

The second part of the book speaketh

. , h tly empr1ses
'
" h1gh feats of arms." 28
'
Of h 1S
kn1g
and hlB

What

emerges most plainly from the History of Saint Louis is the
outlook ·o f a French nobleman at the end of the epic era of
the crusades .

29

The self-consciousness of the nobility, its

aspirations, and the author ' s view of his class ' s place in the
feudal world are discussed within the framework of a royal
portrait and a crusade chronicle.
Unlike Villehardouin, Joinville does not have a propagandistic purpose in narrating the crusade itself.

Therefore,

he recounts the victories and defeats of the crusaders dispassionately.

Villehardouin had to place the sailors from

Marseilles in God's favor to emphasize the rightness of their
conduct and justify the ir actions.

While God, in Joinville ' s

History, is not present every step of the \}way, He makes
occasional appearances, though 'as a broad, general cause rather
than in a specific sense.

Joinville thus attributes his survival

of numerous perils, including a last-minute reprieve when his
execut ion by his Egyptian.:. captors seems certain, to God's grace :
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"And these things will I have written that they that hear them
may have trust in God in their afflictions and tribulations;
and God shall aid them even as me.,,30

In Joinville's work, though ,

divine will is rarely invoked; unlike Villehardouin, he did not
either thank God or lament God ' s will with each description
of a battle won or lost .
Joinville ' s focus, then, is primarily the actions of men
and not of God, and the characters in Joinville ' s history are
drawn so as to represent the eart.hly division of society into
three distinct orders : the nobility, the clergy, and peasant
and burgher class .

For centuries these social classes and

the calling which inhered in each had been described in these
terms.

The duty of the nobles, or defensores, was to uphold

the faith with the sword; the clerics or oratores upheld it
with prayer and discourses.

The duty of the third class , or

laboratores, was to preserve itself and perpetuate the classes
above it.

As Saint Paul had said, the duty of a Christian

was to be aware of his place in the social ordo and conform
to it " in the state in which he was called"(I Corinthians 7 : 20).
For Joinville and for Louis IX, fulfilling the duties of their
rank meant governing themselves according to the chivalric code ,
or being a prud'homme.

31

Being a prud'homme was no mean task, for to be one a
man had to maintain a balance between courage and prudence,
honor and excess zeal, and worldliness and Christian piety.
prud'homme had to be both a warrior and a courtier, a man of
.
.
.
32
both resolute Judgment and complete lntegrlty.
God was crucial for such a man .

S

.
erVlce to

King Louis himself makes a

A
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clear distinction between
a brave man and a man of worth, a preux-homme and a
prud'homme. For there are many brave men, knights in
the land of the Christians and of the Saracens, that never
believed in God or in his Mother. Wherefore I tell you •••
that God giveth a great gift and a great grace to the
Christian knight whom he suffereth to be valiant in body
and that he endureth in his service keeping him from mortal
sin; and he that thus demeaneth himself should men call
prud'homme, a man of worth, for this prowess cometh to
him from God. And them of whom I have spoken may men
call brave men, preux-hommes, for they are valiant, and
fear neither God nor mortal sin. 33
The code of a prud'homme, however, left no room for excessive
zeal.

TOG, much striving for preudomie yielded a lesser, not

a greater sum of virtue.

34

Thus, according to Joinville, those

who advised King Louis to undertake a new crusade in 1267
.
d
.
35
commltte
a ''mortal sln."

To be a prud'homme was to be aware of one ' s calling .

King

Louis and Joinville alike are conscious of their own noble
rank and the obligations inherent in it .

To a knight bested

in theological debate with a Jew, Louis declares vehemently :
And so I say to you that no man, unless he be a very
good clerk, should argue with them; but the layman,
when he heareth the Christian law reviled, should not
defend it but by his sword, wherewith he should pierce
the vitals of the reviler as far as it will go . 36
Louis thus defined the calling of the clerical and noble
classes ; on another occasion he presents his view of the
calling of the laboratores.

When Joinville admonishes the king

that he should endure an ill-behaved but faithful groom because
of long years of service, Louis replies, "He hath not served
us, but we have served him when we have endured him about
us. 37
It

Thus it was a prblilege for the common people to serve

the feudal class, and it was the responsibility of the
prud'homme to recognize this social order .
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In addition to being a manual of preudomie, Joinville ' s
History is also a more rarefied celebration of knightly heroics
and feudal loyalty.

He celebrates a battle simply because it

was fought according to the traditional feudal canons: "And
know ye that this was a very fair feat of arms:

for none

shot with the bow or crossbow, but the strife was all with
maces and swords between the Turks and our own fOlk.,,38
the French nobility

was , : tm:.-c~ling '

long after it became outmoded.

Indeed,

tot.this particular precept

As one historian as written,

Joinville "is the ancestor of the French knights who lost the
Battle of Poitiers because they would fight according to the

.
39
code of chl.val ry. "
Joinville ordinarily took a dim view of martyrdom.

On

one occasion he scorns the advice of a cellarer who expresses
the opinion that "we should let ourselves be killed, for
.
40
then we should all go hence to Paradl.se."

.
He can bubble wl.th

enthusiasm, however, when even a cleric offers himself as a
martyr on the battlefield.

Describing the death of James of

Castel, Bishop of Soissons, Joinville relates that
When he saw that our men were giving way on the side
of Damietta, he who had a great wish to be with God, nor
desired to go back to the land wherein he was born,
therefore made haste to go to God, and set spur to
his horse, and attacked the Turks all by himself, who
slew him with their swords, and set him in the fellowShip
of God, numbered among the martyrs. 4l
That Joinville praises such a wish for martyrdom by a cleric
but ridicules that of a commoner is indicative of the class
prejudice which he, as a member of the nobilitiy, harbored
deeply.
The History of Saint Louis also reflects a deep concern
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for the feudal bond.

While Joinvi11e l aments the death of a

knight who had defied the king's orders and gone unilaterally
into battle, he reports that the king, when informed of the
incident, "answered that he desired not to have a thousand such,
shoUld they disobey his orders as this man had done ... 42

Joinvi11 e

ultimately favors the king's viewpoint in this instance .
When the time arrives for the crusaders to return to France,
Louis declares that it is out of the question for him to "leave
my folk in the hands of the Saracens and not do at least what
h
43
·
I can to d e11ver
tern."

In a final tribute to the king' s

loyalty, Joinvi11e attributes to a cleric speaking on behalf
of Louis ' canonization the statement that
Ye may see that he was the most loyal man that ever lived
in his time, will I tell you that he was so loyal that
even with the Saracens N ou1d he keep the covenant •••
that he had promised ••• by his word alone; and so it was
that if he had not kept it, he would have gained five
thousand crowns and more. 44
"T

Joinvi11e was more of a general observer than was
Vi11ehardouin, who dogmatically argued a particular point of
view.

Moreoever, Joinvi11e's work was not exclusively a nar-

rative of a crusade, and he takes time to linger over the
splendor of Louis' court .

Describing the king' s court at

Saumour in 1241, he discusses the seating arrangement at a feast,
provides a brilliant image of the courtiers' colorful dress, and
marvels at the attendance of a "full three thousand knights ." 45
Joinvi11e also betrays a note of self-consciousness about his
task as a chronicler.

The fate of a certain crusader is

i.mknown to him, and he informs the reader that "I made inquiry
of those who were about

him(~

"

46

In these last two respects

Joinvi11e anticipates the work of Jean

Froissart ( 1330 ' s-1404?),
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"rhose Chronicle of France. England. Spain and Adjoining Countries
is undoubtedly the outstanding French chronicle of the fourteenth
century.
Froissart ' s Chronicle covers the period from 1326to1400,
a period in which "European chivar ry flowered in its final
glory.,,47

The end of the crusades witnessed a diminution in

the religious element of chivalry, so that Froissart, himself
a cleric but also a poet, could write :
All joy and all honor
48
Stem from feats of arms, and from l ove .
While courtly love makes few appearances in Froissart ' s Chronicle,
which focuses . on feats of arms, it is the central focus of his
extensive poetry.
As courtly love rose to occupy an important place in the
chivalric code describe by Froissart, God's role was diminished .
The inclusion of the two was not contradictory; rather, Froissart
wrote "as though he had too much respect for Providence to
connect divine action in any way with the game of war and pOlio

tics which so engrossed his contemporarles."

~9

Between the

battles of the Hundre Years ' War and the internecine war
endemic to late medieval France(a topic which will be addressed
later) the French-nobility was constantl y .! engaged in battle .
Successes and failures in these wars were attributed by Froissart
not to God but to fortune .

The idea of fortune's role in the

governance of affairs waxed greatly in fourteenth-century France
as in Italy; the wheel of fortune, depicted even in the
o

0

.

stalned-glass wlndows of French cathedrals,

50

0

reflected a Vlew

of fortune ' s role expressed by Froissart in his poetry :
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She raises a man aloft;
it matters not to her how he goes;
She then overthrows him
51
and casts him down with a rude blow.
On the very last page of the Chrqnic1e, Froissart comments on
the instability of human affairs.

In describing the fUneral of

King Richard II of England, he writes: " Now consider well, ye
great lords, kings, dukes, earls, barons and prelates, and all
men of great lineage and puissance; see and behold how the fortunes of this world are marvellous and turn diversely.,,5 2
In this passage, Froissart, by addressing himself to "those
of lineage and puissance"
audience of his work.

reveals both the subject and intended

He wrote for a variety of patrons among

Europe's nobi1ity: gPhi1 ippa of Hainaut, the wife of En91and's
King Edward III; Wenceslas of Bohemia; Albert of Bavaria, and
Guy of Blois.

Thus it is not surprising that Froissart reo

flects the outlook of the arlstocracy .

53

0

0

H1S Vlew of the

nobility was cosmopolitan, he admired not just the lords of
a single nation but the entire feudal aristocracy of Europe .
Indeed, Froissart ' s view of society refl ects the bias
of the nobility.

He includes Wat Tyler's rebellion in England

in his narrative only "in order that gentlemen and other s may
take example and learn how to correct such wicked deeds. "
John Ball, one of the leaders of the peasants ' rebellion, is
described as "crazy; " Tyler himself is " a bad man and an enemy
of the nobi1ity.,,54 This is not simply aristocratic disdain for
commoners, though .

The rebels were revolting against what the

nobility perceived to be the divinely ordained pattern of
55
soclety.
Froissart's social attitude may also be illustrated
.

0

by a comparison of his treatment of two unpleasant occurrences,
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the destruction of a city and the death of a knight .

The

sack of Limoges by the English in 1370 is narrated with utter
detachment:
•• • Then there were to be seen pillagers in active mischief. It was a melancholy business; all ranks, ages and
sexes cast them on their knees before the prince(Edward
the Black Prince, the English leader)for mercy; but he
was so inflamed with passion that he listened to none
of them, all were put to the sword . 56
Froissart simply cannot become excited about the death of even
several thousand burghers; the destruction of their city is
but a "melancholy business".

On the other hand, upon the death

of Sir John Chandos, Seneschal of Poitou, whose :::: death moved
his followers to fight "like madmen,"

theE,Etristoo.;t:"atiL~ Jchronicler

attributes ·, to them the following lament: "Oh Sir John Chandos,
flower of knighthood, cursed be the forging of that lance
that wounded thee. u57

For Froissart, nobles are more real as

people than are members of the lower orders of society.
Froissart ' s primary interest is in gallantry and knightly
heroics .

The Hundred Years' War was for him a protracted

pageant .

Froissart himself was a Fleming, serving both

English and French patrons, and supporting neither side .

He

is not hinterested in the political rights and wrongs of the
o
war, bu:b:: lnstead
"favore d gallantry wh erever lt was dO
. lsplayed, " 58
0

and wrote his Chronicle "to the intent that the honorabl e
and noble adventures of feats of arms, done and achieved by
the wars of France and England, should notable be enregistered
and put in perpetual memory."

59

directly relevant to his theme .

He seems bored with topics not
Before discussing the 1385

peace treaty between the count of Fl anders and the city of

79

Ghent, which ended seven years of bloody conflict, he writes,
"I shall beg of you to have the goodnes s to attend to me while
I report how peace was brought about.1t

60

Peace was nothing

more than a tiresome interlude between battles.
Froissart ' s visit to the court of Gaston of Foix provides
much material for the Chronicle .

When Gaston tells him," ••• my

fair son, more gallant deeds of arms have been performed within
the last forty years, and more wonderful things have happened,
than for three hundred years before," Froissart continues:, "
if I have hitherto dwelt on gallant deeds, on hard-fought
skirmishes and battles, and told how castles, forts and towns
were attacked and taken, many more will f0110w.,,61

Froissart ' s

ideal, of course, is a conflict such as the 1367 Battle of
Navaretta, fought by Edward the Black Prince in an effort to
restore King Peter of Castile to his throne, which had b een
usurped by by his brother Henry .

In this battle both sides

excel :
The loss was immense on both sides and the mighty deeds
which were done there are too numerous to be told. The
Prince shone pre-eminently, and proved well.. his noble
birth, and the gallantry of his knighthood, by his eagerness to fight the enemy; on the other side King Henry
acquitted himself right valiantly in every situation. 62
In a work largely devoid of religious content, focusing instead
iT 'J mi
i tary
on military prowess Froissart can, and does, praise the
Saracens for their fine military organization and discip l ine,
writing that "the flower of infidel chivalry was in their town . .. 63
Froissart is obsessed not only with warfare and chivalry,
he also celebrates the trappings that accompany them.
purpose is to entertain the nobility.

His

He wants to recreate

for his readers the splendor of the figures and events

80

descr i bed in his Chronicle .

His recording of visual impressions

.
. .
h as been llkened to "a sequentlal, panoramlc ' take'

64
II

On

the preparations for the Battle of Navaretta, he writes " that
nIt was a beautiful sight to see them approach with their
brilliant armor glittering with the sunbeams.

It was delightful

to see and examine these banners and pennons with the noble
army that was under them . n 65
with his characters '

Just as Froissart is concerned

appea~ces

and not their motivations, it

is the outward appearance of events, not their meaning, which
receives his attention .

Describing the preparations made by

King Charles VI for his unrealized invasion of England in 1386,
Froissart lists no less than forty-two items of arms and
pr6visionsreadied for the channel crossing, including cheese
bowls, ointment, utensils for the buttery, spurs, fat pigs, and
"every article necessary for man and beast . "

66

Froissartts patient cataloguing of the objects accumulated
by the French army can also, to a certain extent, be attributed
to his desire to record the efficacy of the French king's
preparations.

The exhaustiveness of his list also reveals his

rnvn seriousness of purpose .
and objectivity .

Froissart strove for accuracy

Thus, on one occasion, he writes t

Let it not be said that I have corrupted this noble
history through the favor accorded me by Count Guy of
Blois, for whom I wrote it. No, indeed I for I will
say nothing i but the truth and keep a straight course
without favoring one side or the -o ther. 67
Froissart's desire to write an accurate chronicle impelled
him to travel extensively.

He spent several months in Scotland

and Brittany, visiting castles and battle sites, and speaking
.
. . .
68
to numerous lords and knlghts about thelr experlences ln combat .
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Thus, Froissart jumps a t the opportunity to visit Gaston of
Foix.

His stay with Gaston will be very fruitful , since

"knights and squires from all countries assembled at his
::
t .,69
cour
•

Notwithstanding Froissart ' s self-conciousness as an
historian, which led him to seek accuracy and numerous oral
and written sources in the composition of his Chronicle, his
work leaves the reader with little "sense of history."

His

descriptions of battle do not change over the seventy-four
year period he covers, and grow. tedious.

The characters he

c e lebrates never learn, they simply accumulate a
of "high feats of arms.,,70

~owing

record

Froissart betrays no sense that

the society he celebrates was rapidly changing, indeed on the
verge of extinction.

P.S . Lewis has recently argued that to

a great extent the Hundred Years ' War was as much a civil war
of the French kingdom as it was a national war between England
and France. 71

The issue which underlay the Hundred Years'

War concerned the French king's theoretical sovereignty over
his kingdom.

In its most pronounced manifestation, this

conflict was initially a struggle between Edward III of England
and Phillip VI of France , not so much over the crown of France
but over the long-disputed question of Edward's sovereignty
"
,
72
over h 1S
cont1nental possess1ons.

The legitimacy of Edward' s

feudal claims gave many French nobles the opportunity
the side by whose victory they stood to gain the most.

eo

back

Indeed,

many Fren,h nobles supported the English kings throughout the
course of the war. 73

In both a military and political sense,

how"ever, the nobility depicted so glowingly in Froissart t s

82
chronicle was a social order in decline .

In England, the concept

of the "feudal army" had been supplanted by the more extensive
use of paid professional military companie& and the noble style
of battle was decisively

altered by the long bow.

In France,

customary feudal warfare lasted longer, but the conditions of
its service differed little from that of the professional
companies.
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By the 1440's Charles VII of France had created a

national army; the political consolidation of the realm would
not be complete, however, until Louis XI and Charles VIII
quelled the unrest of the duchies

of Burgundy and Brittany,

long the French crown ' s two most powerful vassals.

This crisis

of the military order of society is reflected in Froissart's
Chronicle ..

Gone from his conception of chivalry is the emphasis

on feudal honor which had characterized the work of Villehardouin
and Joinville; military undertakings had become much more
particularistic and their celebration refers almost exclusively
to the military prowess which they displayed, not their service
to a suzerain .
If by the turn of the fifteenth century the medieval notion
of chivalry and the historiography which c e lebrated it had
grown overripe , the last gasps of these forms, after the
Hundred Years' War had ended and "the day of the medieval nobility
was over,,,75 showed that these institutions had grown fully
rotten.
By the middle of the fifteenth century, the customs of
.
.
76
chlvalry were observed only at the courts of prlnces.
The
last two dukes of Burgundy, Philip the Good (1419-1467) and
Ch arles the Bold ( 1467 - 1477), employed historians who served
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as narcissistic mirrors for the anachronistic aspirations of
these still-powerful vassals of the French king.
splendor was celebrated as never before.

Courtly

Olivier de la Marche ,

w·h ose copious Memoirs span the period from 1435-1502, devotes
over one hundred pages to the wedding celebration of Charles
the Bold and Margaret of York. 77

Georges Chastellain, the

Burgundy dukes' official historiographer from 1455 to 1 475 ,
call Duke

Philip~_: "France '

Charlemagne," and

s most magnificent prince since

"the most renowned duke the world has seen

in a t housand years . " He writes that "none of the Roman
emperor/?, e even the best among them, had erer been surrounded
with as much ceremony, honor, and reverence as he was.,,78
Huizinga considers the work of Chastellain to be the supplanting
of truth by a "fairy-story," a work of fantasy ahd splendor. 79
La Marche's description of the "Pheasant's Banquet" held
at the Burgundian court shows the dukes ' continued sense of
self-importance at its most pronounced.

The nobles of the duchy

vow, with Philip "that if it please our most Christian and
victorious king ( Charles VII)to take the cross ••• lshall
80
personally serve with him in this holy crusade."
The entire
Pheasant's banquet is a showy, empty, charade, a "magnificent
. .
. .
81
lllustratlon of verbal fantasy poslng as actlon ."

As Paul

Archambault writes:
The Burgundian word was a surrogate deed, providing
both a sense of accomplishment and a il excuse for
inactivity •.• One measures the height from which the
thirteenth-century ideal of preudamie has fallen when
one recalls King Louis' remark to Joinville that
h~retics are to be refuted not by subtle ar~uments but
wlth a deep sword-thrust through the belly.82
Both Chastellain and La Marche and their patrons clung
to a reality which in truth no longer existed .

The feudal world

84
•

f

of Joinville ' s time ahd long been eclip s ed by the lnexorable
consolidation of the French monarchy.

The new reality was

perceived by Philippe de Commynes, who knew "men and their
motives too well to impute to them high-minded, dispassionate
ideals," and instead "saw them as they are, not as he would
have liked them to be . tf 83

It is to his work that we now turn.

CHAPTER V
PHILIPPE DE COMMYNES
Philippe de Comrnynes ( 1447?-15ll)had more political experi4RCe~

than any of the French chroniclers discussed in the

last chapter, more even than Machiavelli, and the extent of his
career indeed rivals that of Guicciardini's. His Memoirs, the
first s ix books of which cover all but the first three years
of the reign of King Louis XI of France and were written from
1487 to 1491, and whose last two books are an account of King
Charles VIII's expedition to Italy and were written from 1495
to 1498, provide an , insider's view of French royal politics in
the last quarter of the fifteenth century.
abandonment of chivalry as a "magic key"

Commynes' virtual

for understanding

history brought French historiography "up to date," as it were ,
in the way in which it reflected French society and politics .
Commynes was a minor Burgundian nobleman who entered the
service of Duke Charle s the Bold in 1464 .

He served Charles

as an adviser and chamberlain until he switched his allegiance
to King Louis XI I whom he served in a similar capacity and as
an ambassador, until the king's death in 1483 .

He sat briefly

on the young King Charles VIII ' s council of regency, but fell
from favor and was for a short time imprisoned by Charles'
elder sister and regent Anne of Beaujeu when he participated
in the intrigues of Louis of Orl~ans(later King Louis XII )
85
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against the young king .

His fall was the occasion of the writing

of the first six books of the Memoirs .

In 1494 he found himself

back in royal favor and accompanied Charles on his expedition
to Italy.

After completing his Memoirs, he retired to his

estate at Argenton, where he died in 1511. 1
A central issue in all consideration of Commynes is his
switch of allegiance from the duke of Burgundy to the king of
France .

One historian has termed Commynes' desertion an act

of treason which is minimized in the Memoirs by his description
of such acts as commonplace. 2

To an extent, the Memoirs present

evidence of Commynes'sense of guilt about this act .

He mentions

the act of his desertion of Charles only casually: "About this
time(wfiich was in the year
'
k lng
••• ,,3

l4 7~ )I

entered the service of the

That he makes very few references to it afterward,

and none at all in his discussion of Louis Xl's habit of luring
people into his service, is quite striking .

Also, he refers to

himself only as "some friend of the king" when he describes
his secret assistance of the king before his switch in allegiance .
A less critical historian has questioned whether Burgundy
was a country against which one could, in theory,comrnit treason,
and adds that as king , Louis had always been Commynes' ultimate
suzerain.

5

Howey er, Comrnynes himself extends the concept of

treason to encompass more than desertions of a regional sovereign,6

,
and on one occaSlon
terms Burgundy a country. 7

There are other

occasions when the accuracy of Comrnynes' description of his

own questionable conduct is called into question.

To his

cOllusion with Louis of Orl~ans he makes only two implicit
references.

8

The only reference to his imprisonment is made

in the context of a discussion of Louis Xl' s notorious iron

4

87

cages, when he glibly says of the king ' s building of these
facilities for his prisoners:ttA number of people have cursed
him since then, including me, for I tried one of them out for
a period of eight months under our present king."

9

On another

occasion Commynes lies outright about this matter when h e
declares that nobody rose up against the newly crowned King
Charles .

lO

Commynes ' Memoirs clearly reflect self-consciousness,

perhaps even an unsettled conscience, about these two treacherous
acts of his public career .
Why, then, if it disturbed his sensibilities, did Commynes
abandon ChDlrles the Bold to enter the service of the "spider-king? "
One reason was that he was poorly paid by the duke. Louis, on
the other hand, offered him a huge pension, a sizeable estate,
and a wealthy bride.

ll

Probably a more compelling reason, though ,

was Commynes estimation of the two rulers.

Charles was proud

and self-reliant, and refused to heed Commynes ' counsels against
the duke's continued war-making.

Commynes was conservative

and opposed to violence , and a central message of his Memoirs
-4.s that
one should be 0wary of making a battle unless it is
unavoidable, and, if it becomes absolutely necessary,
then all things should be seriously considered before
starting. And most of the time, those who act cautiously
and use good foresight obtain better results than those
who proceed with great arrogance. 12
Commynes clearly respected the king's calculating methods more
than he did the duke's lust for battle.

13

Charles sought on

the battlefield the same honor and glory which received such
naive praise in earlier fifteenth-century chronicles; it
was noted in the last chapter that Chastellain and La Marche
spent their careers in service to the dukes of Burgundy.

Commynes ,

88

however, took a dim view of this by-now moribund conception.
When the duke's English ally asks him to cease his aggression
against Germany, Commynes writes that "he could not bring
himself to do this, however, claiming that his honor would be
trampled underfoot if he left, and offeril'lg other lame excuses . ,,1 4
Commynes ' conception of political affairs reflected his awareness of the decline in political relevance of the chivalric
ideal .

It his distillation of this new reality that gives his

Memoirs their trenchancy as a work both of political theory
and of historiography.
Commynes ' new approach to politics e ntailed a new approach
to history.

His break with previous French historiography,

however, was not a complete one.

On a stylistic level ,

the conceptions of his predecessors
Memoirs.
hear,"

15

can be recognized in the

Commynes ' use of an expression such as "as you will
hearkens all the way back to Vi11ehardouin and the

prose conte.
connotations .

Commynes also glorifies an event's legendary
Of the army with which King Edward IV of England

crossed the channel in 1475, he writes, " Never since the days
of King Arthur had any king of England taken so many men at
once to the other side of the sea."

16

France in Commynes' day

was still organized strictly along feudal lines; thus he shares
with his predecessors the

societ~l

convention of referring to

any nobleman superior in rank to himself as "my lord." Commynes
more clearly expresses his own feudal outlook in describing his
service to Louis XI during the king's illness in 1479: "I
waited on his table for fifteen days and attended his person
like a va1et-de-chambre, which I considered a great privilege
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and was bound to do. "
The Memoirs also reflect the same class prejudices evident
inin previous histories .

Commynes tells of a minor friar who

"had a private audience with the pope, which was a great honor
for such a small man,,,18 and takes it amiss that Louis should send
his barber to negotiate with Mary of Burgundy, calling him
"a minor personage, who was unsuited for the management of so
important an affair. "IQ In a limited way, the tradition of French
historiography is still visible on Commynes' narrations of
milit"a ry affairs.

He could still write that Charles the Bold

.

.

. .

.

assembleJ a "traln of artlllery flne and mlghty for the tlme,"

20

and on another occasion relates that the duke' s army "made a
beautiful sight for those who were still at the rear to behold .,, 2l
After a battle undertaken by Charles, Commynes mentions that
120 men were lost, but only mentions by name the highest-ranking
..
22
casualty of t h e day's flghtlng.
still be praiseworthy.

h met nob ly, coul d
Deat,

Of plans by the citizens of Li~ge to

sally forth and kill both Charles and Louis, who were encamped
near the city during its siege in l468,"he writes that "They
were confident that they would obtain great victory, or if
.
d eat h ." 23
wors"e came to worse, a most glorlous

Commynes

also still recognizes the sanctity of the feudal word of honor,
despite its inconsistency with his own behavior.

When Charles

the Bold betrays the Count of Saint Pol, an acknowledged enemy,
into the hands of the king, Commynes writes :
all the excuses which I could muster up in this case
could not extenuate the disloyal and dishonorable act
which the duke committed when he sent a good and valid
safe-conduct to the ( count)and nevertheless siezed him

90 , ,
,24
'
and sol d h 1m for purely avar1C10US mot1ves .
On another occasion Commynes relates that when in 1475 Louis
XI made peace with the English, "the duke became incensed; -; . •
and referred to several brave deeds of former kings of England
who had invaded France and the pains which they had taken to
acquire honor there.,,25

The invocation of chivalric honor

here is not Commynes' own, however; it is the hotheaded duke ' s .
This temperament, and its manifestations in Burgundy's conduct ,
had been part of of Commynes' reason for deserting Charles in
1472.
I f Commynes ' Memoirs can be placed stylistically in the
tradition which preceded them, the author clearly broke from
this tradition as well .
ornamentation .

His work is relatively free of visual

He occasionally mentions that a particular castle

is beautiful, but even his most elaborate visual description, that
of Venice, where he spent eight months as Charles VIII's resident
ambassada::; is not protracted .

26

He describes Charles the Bold

as "very ostentatious in his dress and in everything elsea little too much.,,27
occasioned an

elab~rate

While for Froissart this would have
and colorful description of the duke ' s

wardrobe, right down to his drawers, for Commynes Charles'
dress was merely pretense and a prince's peccadillo.

Commynes

also does not automatically venerate rank: "There are some lords
with income of less than thirteen silver livres who are proud
to say:

'Speak to my servants' and by this they think that

.

they imitate very important people . "

28

Omitted entirely

from the Memoirs is any mention of Commynes' selection by
Charles as one of the twenty-five Burgundian knights who
participated in a ceremonial joust on the occasion of his
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marriage in 1468 .

Indeed, ''Cornmynes had no use for

. h t h ood." 29
aspects of knlg
of the

~emQ_irs

the decorative

Finally the prose

is quite removed from the elegant style o f

Froissart and Chastell a in, 1vho were both poets and wrote
with the intent to entertain.

By the end of the following

paragraph of the Memoirs, in which Commynes describes the
contents of a letter h e wrote to two members of the Venetian
council, the reader can easily have forgotten the original
idea being related:
In accordance with what we had decided, I wrote to them
the substance of what I had told the major-domo; (I said
that)I had found occasion to continue my office as a good
mediator, as I had agreed to do at my departure from
Venice, and that this was most agreeable to the king and
seemed to me to be necessary, too, for there are always
enough people around to trouble affairs, but there are
few who have both the occasion and will to reach agreement
about a great dispute or who are willing to endure all the
words that are spoken by those who transact such affairs;
for in such armies many different opinions exist. 3D
Here , Comrnynes' style of writing is much more comparable t o
that 'of Guicciardini than it is to that of any of his French
predecessors.
Commynes ' concerns , too, reflect his abandonment of the
feudal-chivalric ideal.

His interest, as will be discussed

later in greater detail , is in practical conduct, irrespective
of imposed patterns for behavior.

Thus he treats, though

sparingly, the administrative capacities of Louis XI.

He

.
. hment of a natlonal
.
.
31
notes the klng
' s establls
pos t al serVlce,

and describes his efforts to centralize the monarchy.

I t was

the king's "singUlar desire, u writes Comrnynes,
to be able to establish a new policy in this kingdom,
principally in regard to delays in legal proceeding, and
in this respect to put strong contro~s over the court of
Parlement •• • He was also very anxious to see used in this
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. 1 ; kingdom one customary law and a single system of measures,
and to have all the customary laws written in French and
put in a beautiful book, so as to circumvent the ruse s
and robberies of lawyers, which are so great in this
kingdom that none other can compare with it in this respect .••
If God had granted him the grace to live another five or
six years without being too handicapped by illness, he
would have done much good for his kingdom. 32
Commynes' description of the 1465 Battle of Montlh~ry, in which
Louis' army held its own against the League of the Public Weal,
gives a clear indication of his concerns.

The feudal formali-

ties characteristic of war led to catastrophe, as did Charles
the Bold's hasty cavalry charge, or they are immaterial; Commynes
does not eulogize the numerous lords killed there.

It

is not

customary chivalric valor described coloristically, but the
wit, skill, and tactics of the various commanders that
interest Commynes.

33

Commynes undertook his Memoirs not as an independent work,
but as a testimony which Angelo Cato(1430's-1496), a Neapolitan
humanist who entered the service ofLruis XI in 1476 and who
was rewarded with the Archbishopric of Vienne, planned to
.
.
..
'
.
34
lncorporate
lnto
a Lat1n
h1story of t h
e k1ng's
re1gn.

Thus Commynes' . original intention was only to provide the
archbishop with "an account of what I have known and heard of
the acts of King Louis XI~ .. 35

Commynes on occasion praises

the king excessively; in a semi-eulogistic pass-age describing
the gravely il l king he writes that Louis was "so wise that
one could not go wrong with time, provided that one simply
obeyed what he commanded, without adding anything of one's own.
In order for Commynes to exculpate himself from wrongdoing in
entering Louis' service it was necessary for him to portray

,, 36
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the king favorably.
is more modest.

In general, though, his praise for Louis

In describing what he considers errors in

judgment on the king's part, he writes:
Chroniclers commonly write only things which reflect
credit on those whose actions they record, and they
omit many things .• • • it is good to think that there is no
prince so wise that he does not err once in a while. 37
Comrnynes clearly hopes that his supposedly objective OutlOOK
on the king's character will be reflected in Cato ' s reliance
upon his testimony in composing his history.
Comrnynes did not see himself as an historian in the formal sense.

He acknowledges that "I am not observing the order

of writing used in histories, and I am not mentioning the
years o f' the exact times during which the events took place .,, 38
Indeed, Commynes'Memoirs are fraught with chronological errors
and mistaken names and places .

He himself is aware of these

failings, and on one occasion begs the reader ' s forgiveness
for, he says, "I wish only to make no errors as to sUbstance ."

39

Note, however, that he leaves the validity of his judgments open
to question:

A.fter one of his frequent didactic asides on the

conduct of diplomacy, he writes that "I realize that there are
many persons more qualified than myself t o speak about
it, but at any rate this is what I would do.,,40
Commynes ' self-consciousness about his historical
technique stems from his view of himself as both a participant
in and an outsider to the French historiographic tradition.
In his pursuit of causal explanations and his search for meaning
in history he far surpasses his predecessors.

Among French

medieval historical writers he was " one of the few,

if not the
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only one , to bring a critical mind to bear on the narration
of events . "

41

Con~ynesl causal analysis of events

distinct levels.

operates on two quite

In the first , God is a distant arbiter of

earthly events, playing the determining role in a mellla-.lilist.:o<r::Lcal
soneme 2.w1n..iJ"(i.!h allows no prince or kingdom to become too powerful :
All things considered, it seems to me that God has
created neither man nor beast without establishing some
counterpart to oppose him, in order to keep him in
humility and fear ••• To the kingdom of France he has
opposed England; to the English he has opposed the
Scots, and to the kingdom of Spain, Portugal ••• To the
princes of Italy ••• God has opposed the communes of
Italy ••• which are often against the lords, and the
lords against them, so that neither may grow. 42
This scheme also operates in a more specific manner .

Both

princes and principalities are the recipients of their just
deserts at the hands of God.

The death of the wicked King

Richard III of England is thus seen as "the true judgment of
God.,,43

Commynes' attribution to God of a role in his "quasi-

..
. .
.
44 correspond s to th e momentousness
.
mec h anlstlc
Vlew of equlllbrlum"

of the changes he describes.

The fall of Burgundy was of

enormous importance to Commynes, thus he asserts not once,
but several times, that the decline of the duchy of Burgundy
after Charles ' death was "equal to their former measure of
felicity.,,45

For Commynes, "historical events, such as

divine compensation, human revenge, political balance of power
and the tragic collapse of men and kingdoms are merely
.

complementary arcs of the pend ulum of hlstory."

46

Commyne s attributes many of his ideas to has master Louis .
Thus he vtrites that "King Louis had a saying, and in my opinion
a wise one, according to which when pride rode before, shame
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and destruction were soon to follow closely ."

47

Machiavelli

had borrowed the ideas ofPolybius in formulating his metahistorical scheme, which operated by the force of its own momentum.

Commynes, on the other hand, was not nearly so well

read in ancient literature, though he refers in certain instances to ancient histories .

In tone and in theory, however,

the meta-historical ideas of the two writers are ultimately
not so very different.
With God as a factor in his causal framework, Commynes
can a l so posit a religio-moral framework for historical
causation.

Rather deterministicallY, h e attributes mis-

fortunes of rulers to their lack of piety.48 This note i s
struck in his account of the fall of Charles the Bolds
I have not seen any reason why he should have incurred the
wrath of God, unless it was because he considered all
the graces and honors which he had received in this
world to have been the result of his own judgment and
valor instead of attributing them to God, as he
should have. 49
Ultimately, it is this framework, with its balancing concept
of divine justice, that Commynes uses to explain the outcome
of the affairs narrated in the first six books of his Memoirs .
Throughout the work Commynes expresses his disapproval of
the scheming intrigues of England ' s notorious RKingmaker,"
the Earl of Warwick, and the Count of Saint ? ol, whose attempts
to playoff Louis XI, Charles the Bold, and England's King
Edward IV against one another result in rare agreement among
the three princes in their common desire to see him dead, is
also condemned by Commynes for his conduct.

Commynes sees

the death of these two characters as punishment at the hands
of God .

This religio-moral framework, in which people are
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rewarded for virtue and punished for vice , receives its final
recapitulation upon the death of King Louis .

According t o

Commynes,
God had granted him some grace, for just as he had created
him wiser, more liberal, and more virtuous in all things
than the other princes who ruled with him and in his
time, so thaibt.he surpassed them in l ev§l rything, so also
he surpassed them in length of life. 50
The second level on which God operates in Commynes ' conception of historical causation concerns not the great changes in the
status of princes and peoples, but
affairs .

~ontingencies

in day-to-day

Whenever events transpire in a manner contrary to

what is anticipated, Commynes discerns the hand of God.

Thus

he writes of Mary of Burgundy's decision not to marry into
a French house, "God • •• decided to bring about another marriage ,
and we probably still do not know why he willed it so . ,,51
Besieging Li~ge in 1468, Charles the Bold won a great victory
despite the fact that his troops were outnumbered and their morale was low.

Charles ' victory " came to him solely by the

grace of God, against all human odds.,,52

These invocations

of divine will to explain events diffe n :rnarkedly from the
examples given earlier.

In those instances, the events de-

scribed are in keeping with Commynes'overarching conception
of divine justice, and he places them in that context .

In

the latter , examples, though, Commynes does not refer to this
theme .

Charles' victory is contrary to t he ultimate resolution

of divine justice which favors Louis XI and brings ruin upon
the duchy of Burgundy, and Cornmynes ~. finds Mary's marr iage
not relevant to it.

In these instances, the 'Yeactions of God

cannot b e placed in any framework; Commynes sees them as b eyond
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human understanding .

A Machiavelli or a Guicciardini

would

have attributed these e vents to an impersonal quirk of fortune .
Commynes, however explicitJ:y rejects fortune as an explanatory agent.

On the fa l l of Saint Pol, he writes:

One might say that fickle fortune had turned aga i nst him.
However, to be more correct, one should say that such mys~ ~r
teries do not derive from fortune; besides, fortune is
nothing more than a poetic fiction, and it must have
been God who had abandoned him. 53
While in this case, in which , events correspond to Commynes '
"divine justice" pattern, one would not expect Commynes to
attribute the outcome to any force other than God, he rejects
fortune entirely as an explanatory aid, and attributes the
unexpected outcome of Mary's courtships to God . despite
the event's irrelevance to his religio-moral framework .
Commynes' dependence on God and rejection of fortune

28

for causal explanation can be attributed to a variety of
factors.

One, his relative lack of familiarity with classical

learning, has already been mentioned.

A second, posited by

two recent historians , takes into account Commynes '
career.

own

Writes Paul ArchambaUlt, "Only in prison, smarting

54
over his social and political fall from grace," :J4 could Commynes

have written that despite man's efforts, God concludes things
at his own pleasure.

55

Samuel Kinser perceives after Cornmynes '

imprisonment "a turn toward piety in a man who until then may
have been accustomed to thank only his own talent and sharp
sense of occasion for h is spectacular career, I, especially
since "this assertion s tands in such discontinuity with his
didactic emphasis on the necessity for calculation and watchfulne ss in pOlitical life •• , 56
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While not rejecting this latter argument, I should like
to suggest another possible interpretation of Commynes ' causal
analysis of the events he narrates.

A comparison of his views

on causation in the two distinct sections of his Memoirs reveals
subtle yet substantial differences in his use of God's will,
human action and fortune to explain, on the one hand, the events
of Louis Xl's day and

on the other, the Italian expedition

of Charles VIII.
It is important to note that Commynes does not explain the
events of either section of his Memoirs exclusively in divine
terms .

While attributing to God the final outcome of events

in England's Wars of the Roses, Commynes also discusses in an
extremely pragmatic fashion the machinations of the Earl of
•
57
narwlck.

TAT

While the demise of the Count of Saint Pol is

accounted for in Commynes' religious framework, as described
earlier, Commynes also views the disesteem earned by the count
as a function of his own behavior.

He describes the count ' s

elaborate posturing to his own exclusive benefit, writing
"thus you may see in what position he had placed himself among
these threee gteat men. "

58

Thus it is not without precedent that Commynes expl ains
events in human terms in the latter part of the work .

As we

will see, though, he relies much more heavily on hUman explanatlOtl
in describing Charles VIII's Italian expedition than he does
in describing Louis Xl ' s reign.
Onee of the tasks of the historian is to seek order in
the historical events he narrates.

We have seen that Commynes

posits an overarching divine framework to explain the reign

99
of Louis XI .

His description of Charles VIII ' s undertaking

also finds him attempting to seek such a framework for his
narrative.

The peg on which Commynes hangs the second section

of his memoirs is the concurrence of the words of the Dominican
friar Girolamo Savonarola and the course of the French expedition to Italy.

Savonarola was a dynamic orator who attracted

an extremely large foll-owing after his arrival in Florence
in 1490.

He preached against the corruption and abuses of the

Church and against the tyranny of Italian rulers .

His

prophecies of the imminent appearance in Italy of an avenger who
would reform the church by force of arms seemed vindicated when
Ch arles VIII crossed the A~ps.59

Commynes was not unaware of

Savonarola ' s role in Fl orentine affairs; in fact the two men
met on two occasions .

It is in a very l imited sense, however,

that Commynes uses S<
a:vonarola' s vision as an organizing principl e .
While he points out that Charles'Italian expedition was predicted in Savonarola's prophecies , 60 he never extends this concept to account for Charles' decision to invade Italy or the
king ' s initial successes in terms of divine will in accordance with the friar's words.

Commynes does, however, explain

Charles' successful retreat from Italy by referring to X
Savonarola's answer to
prepared to return home .

an inquiry Commynes made before Charles
Commynes relates that

I asked him whether the king could pass(out of Italy )
without danger to his person, in view of the large assembly(of soldiers)that the Venetians were making ••• He
replied t o a me that he would meet with some
difficulties on the way, but •.• that God, who had
led him when he came, would lead him again on h i s
return. 61
Throughout his narration of Charles ' retreat from Italy, Gbmmynes
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refers to this prophecy to explain the king ' s narrow escapes
from perilous circumstances.
successfully traverse

For example, when the French

a treacherous mountain pass at

Pontremoli, Commynes writes
•• • it seemed that what Brother Girolamo had told me
was true:
that God led him by the hand until he was
safe; for it seemed that his enemies were blinded and
stupefied, since they were not defending the pass. 62
Commynes himself is astounded at the French army's survival
of numerous close calls in its retreat from Italy.

The predictions

of Savonarola give him an opportunity to make comprehensible
these events.

While pl acing Charles' retreat within this

overarching framework, though, Commynes cannot sustain the use
of this scheme.

He recognizes that the prophecy on which

Savonarola ' s successes had hinged, the reform of the Church in
Italy, was not achieved by the French expedition to Italy.

63

He is also decidedly neutral in his ultimate assessment of the
f riar .

After describing Savona'r ola' s ignominious execution

for heresy in 1498, he writes ; "I do not know whether to excuse
him or accuse him, and I do not know whether they did well to
.
.
64
have hlm
dle.
II

CommynesI

inability to schematize fully

under a divine rubric his narration of the events in the second
section of his Memoirs, especially the failures of the French in
Naples, leads him to rely much more heavily upon human actions
and to introduce, though sparingly, fortune to explain events.
While in explaining the French loss of Naples his overarching
conclusion is that "God had entirely withdrawn from the king
the grace which he had granted him on the
journey to Italy, "

65 at the same time Commynes attributes
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the loss of the kingdom to irresolution on the part of the French .
Charles neglected to send his army sUfficient funds to keep
it manned because "his servants who were involved with this
had little experience and they were l azy . ,,66

Commynes also

sees too much discussion and too little action by the French
army as instrumental in the loss of Naples.

67

Finally, he

relates that after the French had retreated from ItalY, King
Charles "confessed freely that he had made many mistakes
there, and he enumerated them."

68

Commynes thus explicitly

and decisively gives human action a rol e in the loss of the
kingdom of Naples.
This section of the Memoirs also finds Commynes no longer
averse

to assigning fortune a role in the shaping of events.

When Piero de' Medici left Florence in 1494 to negotiate with
Charles and ended up being ousted from power, it was because
"on that day he began to tempt fortune.,,69

While at first the

French were sucx:::essful and welcome in Naples, the year 1495
saw great changes: "Throughout the kingdom people began to
change their minds and fortune began to change when two
months before it had been the contrary"

70

Here Commynes uses

fortune not so much to explainr:lincomprehensible events, as
would Guicciardini, but more in the sense of a "wheel of fortune,"
varying cyclically.

It is likely that his willingness to

invoke fortUne results from the failure of the French in Naples .
The first section of the Memoirs are an account of the successes
of a French king, thus he could write that "God takes a special
' teres t '1n t h'1S k1ng
' dom." 71
1n

In light of the French failure

in Naples, this assertion could no longer be made, thus fortune
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enters into his causal scheme.
Wh ile Commynes' explanations of both Franco-Burgundian
affairs and the French expedition to Naples employ divine and
hUman causation , the human agent is more tangible and more
explicit in the latter section of the Memoirs.

Mo~eover,

Commynes makes use of fortune to explain events .

Perhaps

these difference can be attribute to differences in the
events themselves, and in Commynes' assessment of

the~ .

Commynes clearly sees the reign of Louis XI in a positive
light .

Louis was very successful both in dealing with his

enemies and a n the administration of his realm.

Commynes'

framework for divine action and divine justice is in keeping
with the king ' s successes, as it is with the actions and misdeeds
atrributed to Warwick, Charles the Bold, and the Count of
Saint Pol.

On the other hand, Charles VIII's expedition to

Italy, which Commynes opposed from the outset, was largely
a failure.
high and

Its human and material cost to the French was

nothin~

ultimately, was achieved.

Commynes's earlier

scheme of historical explanation cannot be made consonant
with these events, and the outcome of the expedition and
Savonorola ' s ultimate fate do not allow him to elaborate fully
his narrative in terms of the friar's preachings.

Thus he

speaks of the highly transitory assignment and withdrawal of
divine grace, quite similar to the Italian concept of fortune,
and on occasion invokes the concept of fortune himself.

In

addition, he spends more time explaining events in terms of
hUman factors.

He sees no consistency in the course of the

French invasion of Italy; thus his causal scheme is fragmented
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and disjointed.
Commynes, in part, explained events in terms of hUman
actions.

He was also an ::bbserver of human character, and made

human psychology a part of his narrative.

Charles VIII, accord-

ing to Commynes, "had his heart set" on the Italian expedition. 72
In describing the antagonism of Louis XI and Saint Pol,
he speaks of the king's "uneasy frame of mind," and goes on
to say that "if the two persons of whom I am speaking had many
worries, the king of England and the duke of Burgundy, for
their part, had no fewer.,,73

These, however,

purely internal emotional states.

Commynes displays a still

keener pyscho1ogica1 ability in relating such
external: appealianCes. ap<;ie actions.

portraits of

e~ptiona~

states to

When King Louis recei.ves an!.

English herald with the intent ofpIOposing a peace treaty between
England and France, Commynes writes that "many people were
anxious to hear what the king would say and to see what sort
of expression he would have on his face when he came out of
.
. d ramatlc
. eplsode
.
the lnner
room," 74
and conc1ud es thlS
by
describing the king's emergence from his meeting with the
herald: "His face appeared to reflect great confidence, and
he showed no trace of fear, for he was very happy about the
.
. h hlS
. proposltlons
. .
' h t h e h era1d. 75
receptlon
WhlC
ha d foundWlt
1f

On one occasion, Commynes' psychological insight is truly
astounding.

He writes that while many French nobles appeared

happy and relieved upon the death of Charles the Bold, in
actuality they were uneasy about the prospect of the king' s
increased power.

He bases this conclusion, with remarkable

perception, on the lordS' , conduct at the dinner table, remembering
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that on this occasion

"no one ate even h alf his fill • .,7 6

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, Commynes '
pre-eminent concern was with the practical results of political
conduct, largely divorced from outdated feudal codes.

Commynes

gives high praise to Mohammed II, the Turkish caliph from 1451
to 1481, calling him "a wise and valiant prince, who made more
use of sense and cunning than of valor and bOldness . ,,7'1

Such

cunning, for Commynes, is a great political virtue: "Great c princes,
or at least the wise ones, always look for a good pretense and
.
.
.
78.
..
one Wh1Ch 1S not too ObV10US . "
Th1S tra1t 1S for Commynes
the very basis of diplomacy.

Describing a particular case

of diplomatic maneuvering between Charles and Louis, he relates
that "many envoys were sent from both sides to contrive all
sorts of bargains by intrigue and to obtain the best terms
from each other."
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It is not surprising, then, that Commynes '

favorite adjectives for describing treaties are "advantageous"
and "disadvantageous."

These two words, and not "honorable"

and t' dishonorable;" describe diplomatic affairs .
Only an analyst with an eye toward efficacy and advantage
could write, as did Commynes, "I shall reveal an example of
deceit, or a shrewd piece of business, or what ever you wish'2
to call it, for it was wisely managed ."
that Commynes admires King Louis XI .

80

It is on this basis

Wh ile Joinville had

praised King Louis Louis IX for his preudomie, Commynes praises
his master for playing upon men's avarice{as he had done
with Commynes himself)to

bri~them

into his service:

He was not discouraged if a man he was trying to win
over at first refused to cooperate, but he continued
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his persuasion by promising him many things and
actually giving him monel and dignities which he
knew the other coveted.
Certainly no prud'homme would share Commynes ' opinion that
.
.
.
1t
1S
a great v1rtue
to know

tI

h ow to flee at t h
e "
r1ght t1me ." 82

There is no better illustration of Commyne's abandonment of
his predecessors' feudal-chivalric precepts than his recurrent
statement to the effect that "those who win get all the honor." 83
T o operate efficiently in Commynes' world it was necessary
to possess experience.

Commynes laments his own political

naievet~ during his first years with Charles the Bold, at the
/

Battle of Mont1hery : "I was amazed that anyone dared defend
himself against the prince to whom I belonged; and I be1ieved him to be the greatest ruler of all.
.
.
84
w1thout
exper1ence."

Such are those

C omrnynes also perce1. ve d a great

value in history as a means to educating oneself about the
ways of the world:
It seems to me ( and I speak on the basis of what I have
seeniin this world, which includes eighteen years or more
experience in close relationship with princes, having had
intimate knowledge of the greatest and most secret affairs
which have been transacted in the kingdom of France and
in neighboring territories)that one of the surest
ways to make a man wise is to have him read ancient
history and learn how to conduct and guard himself
and how to manage his affairs wisely, according
to histories and examples of our ancestors.
For
our life is so short ~hat it cannot give gs the
necessary experience 1n so many matters. 8
Here, in composite form, is an expression of Machiavelli ' s
own source of authority, " long exper1ence in modern affairs

and continuous reading in ancient ones,"

86

with which he

justified his advice-giving in The Prince, in a work which
antedates Machiavelli ' s by some twenty years .

Commynes himself
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cannot overemphasize the importance of the study of history:
tt • • •

one can learn more in three months ' time from read:iJ'!).g ·

a book than twenty men living successively could observe and
.

und erstand from experlence."

87

Commynes derived from contemporary affairs as well as
from history many lessons to benefit the tfwiseprince," and
through his own experience he felt qUalified to impart these
lessons.

He assumes tfthat stupid or simple people will not

amuse themselves by reading these memoirs; but princes
court i ers will find some good advice in them. ,.88

o~

Commynes '

reliance upon history's examples is not unflinching, though;
he acknowledges that "enemies and princes are not always
alike ."

But, he continues, "their affairs are often of a

similar nature, and therefore it is useful to be well-informed
of things past ."
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He describes King Edward IV's forced

flight from England in 1470 as a result of unreliable advice
on the trustworthiness .of the Earl of Warwick, and goes
on to write :
This is a fine example for princes who never fear nor
suspect their enemies and who would consider it beneath
their dignity to do so. Most of their servants agree
with them in order to flatter them. And they believe
that they will be more respected and esteemed for it,
and that people will say have spoken with courage. I
do not know what people will say to their face, but
wise persons will surely consider such words very
foolish.
It is all to one's credit to have wellgrounded fears and to protect oneself well against danger. It is invaluable for a prince to have a-i wa se:l.and
trusted man in his entourage; he should be allowed to
speak the truth and the prince should believe him. 90
In this case, Commynes makes a single observation and draws
from it numerous corollaries whose relevance is, admittealy,
questionable .

The Memoirs are indeed full of such sententiae
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on political conduct .

Some are straightforward and so uncontro-

versial as to be banal: "If people were always . wise they would be so
moderate in their words in times of prosperity that they would
··
'
91 Most, though ,
not h ave cause to c h ange ln
tlme of a d
Nerslty.tf

like Commynes ' precepts for the conduct of diplomacy, reflect
his awareness of the questionable morality of his age:
•. • for one messenger or ambassador whom they would send
me me, . I should send them two in return •••For there is no
·'·- -J:5etter nor safer way to send aspy , nor could he be in
any better position to see and hear everything. And
if you send two or three men together, it is hardly
possible that the enemy could be so cautious as to prevent one or t he other from obtaining some useful information, secretly or otherwise .•• One should expect a wise
prince to see to that one or more friends are constantly
about the enemy •••
It may be objected that as a result of this treatment
y.bur. enemy will become all the more proud.
It does not
matter to me if he does. In this manner I shall know
more about his designs. For when all is said and done ,
he who collects the §20fits from such affairs will
also have the honor.
In the end, Commynes ' Memoirs are a work of extraordinary
nist g rical a a rid political insight, as far removed from his pregecessors':· emp:\:!y praise of institutions grown hollow as
was Louis Xl's saigesse from Louis i IX'. s preudomie.

With

Commynes, French historiography can be said to have " caught
up" with, or even anticipated the future of, its Italian
counterpart.

It is fitting, then, that it is an historian

largely of Italian affairs who in discussing Commynes' interest ;
in "the practical wisdom of the prince" writes that "the
modernity of this emphasis scarcely needs comment"
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CHAPTER VI
GUICCIARDINI AND COMMYNES ON THE 1494 INVASION:
crn~ARISON A~m

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis of Commynes ' Memoirs in the light
of their composition in two

distinc~

sections has explained that

Commynes' inability to find a fully workable substructural
explanation for the course of the Rl1?ench expedition to Naples
in divine or meta-historical terms led him to rely heavily
on human action to explain these events. Like Guicciardini,
who in his History of Italy discerns no order at all in these
events, Commynes frees his narrative from all-encompassing
transcendental underpinnings.

The two works are also similar

in they are both attempts to explain failures:

Commynes relates

the failure of the French in Naples in 1494-95, and Guicciardini
the failure of Italy in the face of foreign invasion.

Thus

the two authors no longer reflect the national or civic bias
of their earlier works.

While Guicciardini harbors his

contemporaries' view of Italian superiority, this is not the
axiomatic principle that it was for his humanist predecessors.
Thus he can describe the French army which descends on Italy
in glowing terms.

He writes that while King Ferrante of

Naples proclaimed publicly his great power, he "realized full
well " that the French were "greatly superior in cavalry, infantry;
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sea power, artillery, money and men most ardent to confront
every peril for ••• their king. ,,1

Likewise, Commynes describes

Charles VIII' s actions in terms of his i ncompetence in handling
affairs , for example in his remarks on the king's seemingly
infinite capacity to procrastinate, which made perilous the
French retreat from Nap1es . 2

In their accounts of the

Neapolitan expedition, the bvo histor i ans' attempts at dispassionate and particularistic explanations lead them to make
many similar observations and draw many similar conclusions from
the events they narrate .
Both Guicciardini and Commynes see through French attempts
to justify the expedition as the first step towards a crusade .
Guicciardini writes that Charles ' advisers
filled his head with vain thoughts to the effect that
this would provide him with an opportunity to surpass
the glory of his predecessors, for once having acquired
the kingdom of Naples, it would be e asy for him to
conqq a a:?' r the Turkish empire. 3
Commynes is much more direct in expressing hi s opinion of the
chimerical nature of Charles ' expression of a desire to u se
the conquest of Naples as a stepping-stone to a crusade :
According to Commynes, "this was a very bad thing (to say) ,
b ecause

1. t

1e
. •• • ,, 4
was a l

Commynes and Guicciardini also

provide similar descriptions of Charles ' decision to assert
his Neapolitan claim and his preparations for the expedition.
Writes Commynes: "The enterprise seemed most unreasonable to
·
.
d
those wh 0 were Wlse
and experlence

.ff

5

In fact, says

Commynes, only three people approved of the expedition .
The first was the king himself.

The second was Etienne of

Vesc, tt a man of petty lineage who had never heard or seen
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anything. ,, 6

The third was a receiver of taxes named

Briconnet, who advocated the expedition because he stood
to gain a cardinalate and many benefices.

7 Charles was also,

according to Commynes, ill-prepared for the expedition: "All
the things necessary for such a great enterprise were lacking.
For the king was very young ••• (and)feeble in person. He had
few wise persons about him.

He had no ready cash ••• (The army)

h a d nel'ther t ent s nor pavl'1'lons .•• "8

On a later occasion

Commynes adds that this was Charles ' first venture outside
of his own kingdom. 9 After reading Commynes' catalogue of why
the expedition should fail, it is surprising that the French
army makes any headway at all in Italy.
'~nc1ude

Commynes is forc'ed to

that this tripo •• was led by God because the judgment of

"
10
the 1eaders ••. was hardly of any use to the expedltlon."

Here Commynes is invoking God in a manner different from that
of Villehardouin, who described events he himself considered
to be part of a divine purpose.

Commynes is also invoking God

in a manner unlike that in the earlier part of the Memoirs.
God here guides events that transpire contrary to what should
be expected.

Though, as we have seen, he uses Savonoro1a's

prophecies to explain some of the French army's successe s ,
these instances are not numerous, and this theme is not sustained throughout his account of Charles' Italian adventure.
To a larger extent, Commynes discerns here inscrutability in
history, more in line with his later comment on unforeseen
events while Charles VIII wis at Rome: "God showed how all
,
,
11
,
these thlngs were beyond man's understandlng."
ThlS a ppraisa1 of God ' s role in history has more in common with
Guicciardini' s concept of fortune than it has with any

.1 ll
notion of a discernibl e pattern of divine causation .
Guicciardin2s account of the circumstances of the French
decision to undertake the war, and their preparation for it,
is strikingly similar to that of Cornmynes.

He says that while

some of the king's advisers favored the expedition, people
of greater wisdom judged
judgedt that such a war would inevitably prove very
difficult and aangerous inasmuch as the armies had to
be brought to a foreign country, very far from the kingdom
of France • ••
Added to this was the lack of money, of which it was
considered a great deal would be necessary.12
Guicciardini goes on to say of those who advised the were
tha
that they were "stirred by hopes either of acquiring property
in the kingdom of Napl es or obtaining certain ecclesiastical
preferments and reveiines . ,,13

Finally, he concludes that "King

Charles was eager to make war in Italy, preferring the rash
counsels of inexperienced and vulgar men over the example
of his father, a prudent king of long-proven experience.,,14
Guicciardini, like Commynes, thinks ill of Charles, and
prefers the wisdom of Louis XI, who at the outset of his
reign had shocked his Angevin and Orleanist subjects by
,
declarlng
th
at Italy was bestI
left to the'
tallans. 15
ThE:The similarity of the the two authors may be explained partly
by Guicciardini's consul t ation of Commynes' Memoirs in his
,

pr~paratlon

,
of the Hlstory
of Italy, 16 though t h ere are doubts

about the accuracy a :nd · completeness of the editions of the
'
,
,
d'lnl, . 17 But thlS
,
'
MemOlrs
Wh'lCh were avallable
to GUlcclar

fact cannot account fully for Guicciardini's sympathy for
Commynes ' outlook as, for exampie, Guicciardini ' s praise

1 12
for Louis XI seems all his own, in line with his own view of
gratuitous war-making.

He was also aware, before his reading

of Commynes' Memoirs. of Charles VIII ' s character, having
written some thirty years earlier in his History of Florence
that Charles was "a bold young king" who "was by nature inclined
to this sort of enterprise.,,18

Moreover, Guicciardini was not

constrained to use Commynes as his source .

Had he been so

inclined, he could have used instead the account of Andre de la
Vigne , a court historian of Charles VIII, who kept a daily
chronicle of the French expedition to Italy.

In this work,

"Charles VIII and his nobles are types of Christian knights
engaged in the first preliminaries of a gigantic struggle to
.
d ers." 19
free t h e holy land from the lnva

The fact that

Guic~i:ardini

chose to use Commynes' account must be seen as a result of the
two men's common outlook on what is important in pOlitical
affairs a nd historical investigation, for, as we will see ,
their concerns concur in almost all particulars.
Even their political conceptions have a great deal in
common.

Guicciardini ' s Discourses of Logrogno, written while

Florence was ruled by a broadly based republic, advocates
reform in favor of aristocratic control of the processes of
gove.r nment.

His model state is b ased upon his interpretation of

..
'
20
t h e constltUbDn
of V
enlce.

Commynes shares Guicciardini ' s

view of the merits of locating power in the hands of the
aristocracy and his admiration for Venice ' s government. The
Venetians, writes Commynes,
do not have civil strife in the city, and this is the greatest
wealth that I can see that they have. And they have
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marvelously well provided for that in many respects ,
for ••• the people have no influence and are not
consulted in any matter and all the office-holders
21
are gentlemen with the exception of their secretaries .
Their similarity of outlook on what constitutes a wise prince
is evident in Guicciardini's condemnation of Piero de' Medici
in the History of Florence: ttIf he did decide to trust someone
or take advice, he never sought out men who had any great
experience in government ."

22

This recalls strikingly Commynes '

emphasis on a prince's need for sound advice discussed in the
previous chapter .

Guicciardini, like Commynes, spent part

of his career as an ambassador.

His insights into the conduct

of diplomacy, cUlled from his experience at the court of
King Ferdinand of Aragon, are similar to those which Commynes
distilled into his advice to princes on the nature of an
ambassador's duties.

Guicciardini, in his Ricordi, observes

that "the tyrant does everything possible to uncover the secret
of your mind, by flattery, by long conversation, and having
you observed by others who by his orders make friends with you . ,,23
It is in the two men's historical descriptions and historical
judgments, however, that the affinity of their ideas is most
apparent.

For a Frenchman, Commynes ' description of Medici

political power is most penetrating ;

Lorenzo was possessed

of great power, but
he wielded this power with great moderation, for ••.
he was one of the wisest men of his age ~ But the
son thought this (pawer)was his by right, and he
made himself feared by means of (his)guard; he
perpetrated violence at night and fights, and he
helped himself abundantly to their public monies . So
had the father A but so shrewdly that they were almost
happy about it~4
Guicciardini, who gives Lorenzo high praise as the guardian of
Italy ' s pre-1494 peace ,

25

writes that Piero, on the other hand,

114
was not ., capable of governing with that moderation with which
his father had proceeded in both domestic and foreign affairs ... 26
Likewise, just as Commynes describes Florence ' s motivation for
overthrowing Piero in 1494 in terms of the Medici ' s undermining
of FlorentiYEliberty,27not especially emphasizing the French
expulsion of Florentine merchants as might be expected, Guicciardini
relates that many Florentines "highly disapproved of the
present government, and the fact that a single family should
·
· l. tO ltself
.
h ave arrogate d the power of t h e entlre
republlc
. 28

Most events are explained by the two historians in
similar terms.

Describing Piero de ' Medici ' s trip to negotia te

with Charles VIIIin 1494, Guicciardini relates that Piero
capitulated to all of

CRar~es' ~umerous

and excessive demands .••

All the French were greatly amazed that Piero had so lightly
complied with such important demands; for the king undoubtedly
would have been satisfied with easier terms 'i ,,29

Guicciardini

has clearly drawn upon Commynes' account of the negotiations, but
spares the reader from some of the more undignified details of
the events .

Commynes relates that Piero

agreed to everything without Gonsulting his companions •••
this amounted to putting their state and their power into
our own hands. Those who dealt with Piero told me about
it, making fun of him and expressing shock at how he
granted such great things, things which they never had
expected . 3D
An historian in the French chivalric mode might have attributed
Piero ' s capitulation to his fear of the superiority of French
arms, and included a de scription of the colorful banners and
gleaming swords of the French camp.

On the Italian side" a

sycophantic humanist would have attempted to apologize for
Piero's capitulation.

Guicciardini, though, attributes

Fiero's conduct to his poor judgment, and Commynes, making
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no referenceto divine intercession on behalf of Charles '
Neapolitan destiny, explains it only in terms of Piero's personal
failure.

Both authors l ook directly at the actions of the

actors on the historical stage to explain the course of events .
As we have seen previously, Guicciardini surpassed
his predecessors in his interest in motivations for rulers '
actions.

Commynes, too, was concerned with motivations, and

like Guicciardini attributes many actions to cupidity and
ambition.

Commynes says that as soon as Charles VIII had

control of Pisa, Ludovico Sforza
'
the k lng
ou t

0

f It a 1 y a 1 rea d y. 11~1
,11.

I1

wou1d have liked to have
Though in this instance

Commynes ' explanation does not approach the thoroughness of
Guicciardini's, he shares Guicciardini's emphasis

on Ludovico' s

desire to put an end to the French expedition as soon as
the king reached Tuscany.

32

An examination of Commynes'

and Guicciardini ' s analyses of the purposes of the Venetian
government, in both the ir initial neutrality in the 1494 war
and their subsequent jo±hing i of the League of Venice against
the French.

According to Guicciardini, when before the French

expedition the prospect of war hung over Italy,
Only the Venetians determined to remain neutral and
await the outcome of this affair, either because it
was not to their advantage that Italy should be in
turmoil, in hopes that protracted wars of others would
" .give
them an opportunity to expand their empire; or
because, being so powerful, they were therefore not afraid
of easily falling prey to the conqueror; and that it was
therefore unwise, with no evident necessity, to become
involved in other people's wars. 33
Commynes' explanation of Venetian motives focuses on the
former, avaricious concern, rather than on the latter,
prudential one .

He asserts that " it seemed to the Venetians
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that it would be to their profit if wars would break out
between the king ( Charles VIII) and the house of Aragon'~ 34
The two writers place the Venetian decision to adhere to the
leagu~

which bore their city's name at exact same moment .

Writes Commynes :
When Venice became aware that the king had the Florentine ' s
places in his hands, and especiallY Pisa, they began to
be afraid, and they discuss~d(with Ludovico Sforza's
ambassad~5s)means of preventing him from proceeding
further.
Guicciardini concurs :
•• • after seeing the vehement course of French good
fortune, and how the king and his army were passing
through Italy like a thunderbolt without any resistance,
the Venetians began to consider the misfortunes of others
as dangers to themselves, and to fear that the ruin
of others would inevitabl ¥ invo:l1ve tileir own; especiallY
the fact that Charles had occupied Pisa and the other
Florentine fortresses. 36
The context of these analyses in the two works reflects
the experiences and the national concerns of the two historians .
Guicciardini includes in the History of Italy an ' extended
discussion of Florence ' s reasons for not joining the League .

37

Commynes' description of the actions of the Venetians occurs
within a discussion of his own embassy at Venice, where he
represented Charles during most of the French stay
in Italy and negotiated extensively with the ambassadors of the
other Italian powers.38 . These differences of national emphasis
are frequently discernible in the two works .

Commynes delves

more deeply into the politics of the French bureauuer?,cy in
Naples, while Guicciardini discusses extensively Florence's
political scene in the aftermath of the expulsion of Piero de '
Medici .

A page-by-page reading of the two accounts of the

events of 1494-95, though, yield no essential discrepancies
of fact , and, as mentioned earlier, many similar judgments .
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In the previous chapter it was noted that the French
loss of Naples is framed by Commynes largely in terms of human
causal agents .

Commynes writes that Charles was "badly served •••

by hi s governors, who have managed their own affairs very
well . but his affairs badly,,,39 and condemns Charles ' policies
because "he did not make any effort to take care of the matter
personally."

40

As an Italian, with less concern for the

nitty-gritty of French affairs, Guicciardini gives a more
compact rendition of the same ideas .

Charles, he writes , "left

the governing of weighty affairs to his courtiers, who, partly
as a result of incapacity and partly because of avarice , made a
.
.
41
.
.
great confus10n of all th1ngs . "
It 1S also worth not1ng that
Guicciardini does not serve national pride by celebrating the
efforts of the people of Naples to expel the foreigner.

The

French lost Naples more than the self-serving Neapolitan
barons regained it from them, and Guicciardini acknowledges this
fact.
The most important mil itary engagement of Charles VIII ' s
Italian wars was the Battle of Fornovo of July

l49 5~, .

in which

the retreating French army faced the combined forces of the
League of Venice.

Thus, the treatment given the battle by the

two authors is most relevant to any comparison of their
views.

Commynes, in all likelihood as a result of his familiarity
42

with the work of the historians of ancient Rome, recognizes
nature ' s prophecies concerning the outcome of battles. The night
before the battle, he writes, tfthere was a great rain, lightning, and thunder, so strong that one could not imagine more; it
seemed heaven and earth were splitting , or that it signified a

11 8
great misfortune to come ."
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However, it is Guicciardini, more

familiar with Roman historians and himself writing a 1ttrue
history, If in the humanist sense, who makes more of these
m~rological

occurrences, describing their real and imagined

significance:
This storm troubled the French roore U :han the Italian
army, not only because they were in t h e midst of
mountains and enemies in a place where, if misfortune
struck them, they had no hope whatever of saving themselves ••• but also because it seemed more likely that
threateniilgs s from heaven, which usually manifest
themselves only for. the most important reasons, were
primarily directed against than side ~here the person
of so strong a King was to be found. 4
Similarly, CCommynes' Memoirs are not structured independently of
the tradition out of which his historiography emerged.

Thus

it is not unexpected that he should provide a striking visual
description of the army fielded by the Marquis of Mantua: "They
were all · men-at-arms in armor with fine plumes and beautiful
bordonasses(a type of lance)."
would have been
or a la Marche.

45

routin~l ¥cd.ncluded

Indeed, such an observation
in the work of a Froissart

Commynes, however, departs markedly from the

French tradition in describing graphically how the pages of
the French army weret a 13le (j' gwith the hatchets used in the
construction of the French encampment, to crack wide open
.

.

both the helmets and the skulls of armore d Itallan soldlers .

46

Aspects of their accounts of the conduct of the Battle of
Fornovo also reveal the historians' similar concerns.

Both

report the suppression of theFrench army's temptation to
pillage the Italian camp by cries of "Remember Guinnegate, U
a reference to a 1479 battle which Louis XI's nearly victorious
army lost its advantage over its German adversary because
it was lured away from the battle by the prospect of acquiring

11 9
booty .

47

Commynes here also reflects his perception of

history ' s ability to teach by example. While Guicciardini may
have included this detail only because he read it in Commynes '
Memoirs, this is clearly an instance where his usual skepticism
about the wisdom of taking

exampi!ies from history is mitigated

by simi1arites of circumstance.

48

Both Commynes and Guicciardini

mention the speed with the battle progressed, pointing out
that this was uncharacteristic of Italian warfare. Both
historians perceived this distinguishing feature of the Battl e of
Fornovt), noting that traditiona11yl y :):ta1 ian battles pitted
.

.

. .

slng1e squadrons agalnst each other ln succeSSlon .

49

.

Flna11y,

Commynes and Guicciardini concur in their opinion on the outcome
of the battle, even though "each side sought to claim victory
for itse1f.,,50

Commynes writes that while the Italians who

fought alongside the French

wanted to remain at Fornovo "ito

combat those a mong the enemy "[ho remained,ttthe Frenchmen
who were asked about it(Commynes himself was undoubtedly among
them)did not agree and said that we had accomplished enough" 51
Guicciardini, writing long after the battle took place, says
that
the palm of victory was universally accorded to the
French: because of the great difference in the number
of the dead, and because they had routed the enemy to
the other side, and because they had won free passage
to advance, which was the very issue for which the
battle had been fought. ' 52
Both Commynes and Guicciardini perceive the momentousness of
this battle and their analyses penetrate to its very essence .
Francesco Guicciardini, in the History of Italy, and
Philippe de Commynes, in his Memoirs, represent the development
of their respective traditions into the quest for

1 20

historical investigation.

Guicciardini ' s tradition focused on

the republican ideal of Florentine humanism

This strain was

most present in the work of the fifteenth-century humanist
historiographers, who exalted Florence' s institutions as
comparable to those of r epublican Roma This tradition
persisted into the earlYf:cirrIuecento historians and Guicciardini r s
own early work .

After Italy's institutions had failed her,

Guicciardini realized that an understanding of Italy' s subject ion
to foreign rule could not be reached within this limited
setting, and extended his scope to all of Italy and, where
relevant, the affairs of Europe .

Florence could no longer

legimately be seen as the focus of European pOlitics.
Commynes, too, transcended the bounds of his inherited
tradition.

His predecessors' formulaic use of chivalry to

give meaning to history no longer had any relevance in French
politics.

He instead sought to understand events on their own

terms, with a meaning beyond the heroic feats of historical
protagonists.

Commynes was able to posit an overarching

framework for the reign of Louis XI, the subject b f the first
section of his Memoirs, but his failure to find a viable
framework for the second part of his work led him to examine
human causation.
While both Commynes and Guicciardini inherited stylistic
and i fermal traits from their traditions, these were never so
pronounced as to interfere with their searches for explanation .
They wrote in a heavy plodding style which allowed them to
analyze their subject matter as carefully as language would allow .
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Both men were participants in the events they describe,
and both narrate what were essentially failures.

Commynes,

unable to find a framework for his narration, blames the French
fail ure in Naples on men who ' :exercised judgments contrary to
his own.

Guicciardini himself was intimately involved with

Italy's vain efforts to stem the tide of foreign domination.
He blames Italy's fate on the ambition and folly of princes ,
but also on the totally unfathomable mysteries of fortune .
He sought explanations, but could find none.
The litmus test of an historian's conceptual ability is
the capacity to perceive the effects of the events described .
In the cases we have been discussing, both historians pass this
test.

Commynes wrote the second part of his Memoirs, in 1496 ,

in the immediate aftermath of his subject-matter, and could
littl e benefit from historical distance .

Yet he perceived

the total failure of Charles VIII's Italian escapade.
focus is

alsona~rdW?d

His

by the limited importance of these events

to the affairs of France, but he recognizes that ttall these
wars ofI Italy had miscarried, ••• afterwards all was 10st.tt 52
Still, from the French point of view the story would begin
completely anew upon Lou i s :"£XI I , s 1498 invasion.

For Guicciardini ,

a chain of events had been set in motion that would shatter
the very structure of I taly.

Writing forty years later, he

saw the invasion not as a single episode,

but as "the b e =:

ginning of those years of misfortune, because it opened the
door to innumerable calamities, in which ••• a great part of
.
,,53 Bothhlstorlans,
'
.
the world was subsequently lnvolved.
to the

extent that they could, investigated the effects of historical
events .

tn seeking the causes of events, both good and bad,

1 22
in human conduct, they investigated not only past events but
sought to investigate the human condition.
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